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A FURTHER LEGAL INQUIRY INTO
RENEGOTIATION: I*

Charles W. Steadmant

R

ENEGOTIATION has undergone some important changes
which call for consideration. Congress .has undertaken to rewrite
the Renegotiation Act. Administrative and procedural developments
have created new problems. The act is being attacked as unconstitutional. Procedural technique and statutory interpretations have crystallized sufficiently to permit careful scrutiny. And the problems
regarding the determination. of excessive profits, questions of taxation,
amortization, cost allowances, as well as the constitutionality of the
act, are a challenge to a continued study of this law and its administration.
CHANGES AND PROBLEMS CREATED BY THE REVENUE AcT OF 1943
These demand first attention. Renegotiation has been changed but
its fundamental concepts remain the same. Congress conducted a c;nstant examination of the Renegotiation Act almost from the time of
its enactment. It has been continuously considering proposed changes.1
The problems presented to Congress created by the act have resulted
in a series of four amendments. The first of these 2 was largely for
the purpose of clarification and a better definition of the scope of the

*

Any opinions set forth in this article are those of the author and are not official
expressions of the War Department.
Major, Ordnance Department; Chief of the Legal Division of the War Department, Cleveland Ordnance District, since 1940. A.B., University of Nebraska;
LL.B., Harvard.
'
The author wishes to acknowledge the important research assistance of Mr.
Dwight Parsons of the Ohio bar.
Previous articles by Major Steadman dealing with renegoti"ation have appeared in
the August, 1943, and the February, 1944, issues of the REVIEW.
1 The Senate Committee on Naval Affairs, House Committee on Ways and Means,
House Committee on Naval Affairs, House Committee on Appropriations, and Senate
Committee on Finance have all held hearings examining renegotiation.
2
Section 801 of the Revenue Act of 1942, Pub. L. 753, 77th Cong., 2d sess.,
approved October 21, 1942, 56 Stat. L. 798 at 982.
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act. The second amendment3 added four subsidiaries· of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation as renegotiating agencies-Defense
Plant Corporation, Metals Reserve Company, Defense Supplies Corporation_ and Rubber Reserve Company. The third amendment 4 extended the definition of "subcontract" so as to bring within the scope
of the act brokers, agents and commission men receiving $25,000 or
more during· any fiscal period from contracts or subcontracts with the
renegotiating departments. The fourth amendment is by the Revenue
Act of 1943 which is the most far-reaching and comprehensive change
that has been made in the act. A complete rewriting of the law was
undertaken. Nevertheless, the revisions that have been brought about
are primarily as to form rather than substance. The underlying theory
of renegotiation as an instrument for the elimination of excessive or
exorbitant profits from war contracts remains unaltered. This policy
is unchanged.
In understanding the effect of the amendments to the Revenue Act
of 1943, it is perhaps equally as important to examine those things
that Congress did not do as to study the changes that were made.
Among the changes that Congress was ,asked to provide for were these:
( 1) A redefinition of subcontract so as to eliminate from renegotiation all but those subcontractors furnishing items that become a
part or component of the final article furnished to the renegotiating
agencies. Such an amendment would eliminate the manufacturers of
machine tools, for example.
( 2) The determination of excessive profits after, rather than before, taxes.
(3) The setting up of reserves for postwar rehabilitation of plant
and equipment.
( 4) Eliminating from renegotiation the sale of standard commercial articles to the war agencies.
(5) A fixed percentage of profit formula for determining the excessiveness of profits realized through doing business with the renegotiating agencies.
( 6) A review by either the Tax Court or the Court of Claims.
( 7) Raising 'the exemption measured by the dollar volume of
business with renegotiating agencies from $100,000 to $500,000.
( 8) Extending the mandatory exemptions to agriculturai products.
( 9) Exempting construction contracts from renegotiation.
3

The Military Appropriations Act of 1944, Pub. L. 108, 78th Cong., Ist sess.,
approved July 1, 1943, 57 Stat. L. 347 at 347-348.
4
Pub. L. 149, 78th Cong., 1st sess., approved June 14, 1943, 57 Stat. L. 564.
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(Io) Close adherence to the allowances, deductions and exclusions
as provided in the Internal Revenue Code and to the method of cost
accounti~g regularly employed by the contractor as the basis for determining costs.
( I I) Allowance of the amortiz~tion deduction in the event of a
recomputation as provided in section r24(d) of the Internal Revenue
Code on account of an acceleration of the amortization period for
privately financed war facilities.
( I 2) Recognizing as an item of cost in renegotiation, the carryover and carry-back provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.
Many of these proposals found their way into the act but there
were many things that Congress did not •adopt. Subcontract was not
redefined except to exclude office supplies from renegotiation. There
was no change made requiring the determination of excessive profits
after, rather than before, taxes. The setting up of reserves for postwar
rehabilitation of plant and equipment did not receive congressional
sanction. Standard commercial articles were not eliminated from renegotiation but provision was made to permit the administrators of the
act to eliminate such items in the exercise of administrative discretion
where the competitive conditions affecting the sale of these articles are
such as to protect the Government against excessive prices, that is, to
insure that excessive profits are not being realized by any significant
segment of the industry producing and selling such articles. The
suggestion that renegotiation be conducted by. the application of a
fixed percentage of profit formula to income was rejected. The carryover and carry-back provisions of the Internal Revenue Code were
not extended to renegotiation. Congress provided, however, for review
by the Tax Court. The exemption measured by the dollar volume of
business with the renegotiating agencies was raised from $ I 00,000 to
$500,000. The 1943 Act specifically exempts contracts or subcontracts
for agricultural commodities in their basic state. Construction contracts
wherein competition is provided under certain conditions have been
exempted and adherence to the allowances, deductions and exclusions
as provided in chapters I and 2E of the Internal Revenue Code and
to the method of cost accounting regularly employed by the contractor
as the required basis for determining costs has been adopted. Moreover,
the allowance of the amortization deductions in the event of a recomputation through an acceleration of the amortization period, as
provided in section r24(d) of the Internal Revenue Code, has been
incorporated in the act. There have been many other changes which
will be discussed at length but the importance of this observation here
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is that Congress, after examining all of these proposals, determined
to leave the fundamentals of renegotiation unaltered.

General Outline of the New Law
The amendments to section 403 of the Sixth Supplemental National
Defense Appropriation Act, as amended,5-the Renegotiation Actthat have been made by section 701 (b) of the Revenue Act of 1943
constitute a rewriting of the Renegotiation Act. This new statute is
applicable to all fiscal years ending after June· 30, 1943. Certain portions of it are also effective with respect to fiscal periods ending before
July 1, 1943.6 This is by virtue of the fact that parts of section 701 (b)
are retroactive to April 28, '1942, the effective date of section 403 as
originally enacted. Otp.er provisions of section 701 (b) became operative on the effective date of the Revenue Act of 1943, February 25,
1944. The remaining provisions of section 701 (b) are effective only
as to fiscal years ending after June 30, 1943. Thus, in applying rene5
Renegotiation Act of 1942. Section 403 of the Sixth Supplemental National
Defense Appropriation Act, 1942, Pub._ L. 528, 77th Cong., 2d sess., approved April,
28, 1942, 56 Stat. L. 226 at 245 as amended by § 801 of the Revenue Act of 1942,
Pub. L. 753, 77th Cong., 2d sess., appioved October 21, 1942, 56 Stat. L. 798 at
982; by the Military Appropriation Act, 1944, Pub. L. 108, 78th Cong., 1st sess.,
approved July 14, 1943, 57 Stat. L. 564. These provisions of the Renegotiation Act of
1943 (cited in this article as the 1943 Act) are made retroactive as if they were part
of the Renegotiation Act of 1942:
(1) Subsections (a)' (4) (C) and (a) (4) (D), relating to the allowance of
the recomputed unused amortization deduction;
(2) Subsection (i) (1) (C), relating to the exemption of contracts or subcontracts for certain agricultural commodities;
(3) Subsection (i) (1) (D), relating to the exemption of contracts or subcontracts with charitable, religious, or educational institutions;
(4) Subsection (i) (1) (F), relating to the exemption of subcontracts under
prime contracts or other subcontracts exempted under paragraph one of subsection (i);
(5) Subsection (i) (3), relating to a fair cost allowance for certain raw
materials and agricultural products in the exempted state in the case of integrated
producers and to the exclusion from renegotiation of profits realized· which are
attributable to the increment in value of an excess inventory; and
( 6) Subsection (1), which gives section 403 the short title of the "Renegotiation Act."
Subsection (e) (2) whish relates to a redetermination of excessive profits by
the Tax Court of the United States where unilateral determinations have been
made by the secretaries of the departments with regard to fiscal years ending _prior
to July 1, 1943 also provides for redetermination by the Tax Court of ex~essive
profits for those fiscal years ending before July 1, 1943 and should be considered
in conjunction with the Renegotiation Act of 1942.
6 See note 5 supra.
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gotiation to a fiscal year ending before July r, 1943, section 403, as
amended, prior to the enactment of section 7or (b) together with those
provisions of section 701 (b) made applicable to such fiscal years, will
govern such a renegotiation. The renegotiation of fiscal years ending
after June 30, 1943 will be upon the basis of section 701 (b ). For ease
of identification in this article section 701 (b) of the Revenue Act of
1943 will be called the "1943 Act." 7 Where the Renegotiation Act is
referred to as it existed prior to the enactment of section 701 (b), it
will be called the "1942 Act." 8 Fiscal years ending before July 1,
1943 will sometimes be stated as "1942 fiscal years," after June 30,
1943, as "1943 fiscal years."
The statutory revisions brought about by the Revenue Act of 1943
fall generally in these categories:
( 1) Procedural changes which relate to the organization for the
conduct of renegotiation, methods of review, periods of limitations and
the discontinuance of renegotiation.
(2) Alterations primarily in reference to the way in which excessive profits are to be determined. These amendments establish certain
statutory standards, direct that contracts shall be renegotiated in the
aggregate rather than individually, define profits and specify allowable
costs, exclusions and deductions.
(3) Amendments of an exempting and exclusionary nature which
recast the area embraced by renegotiation.
( 4) An amendment relative to the tax e:ffect of renegotiation.
PROCEDURE

Organization for Renegotiation
Section 701 (b) of the Revenue Act of 1943 establishes an overall
agency for the administration of renegotiation known as the War Contracts Price Adjustment Board.9 Under the law, prior to the enactment
of this amendment, the renegotiating authority was placed with the
7
Renegotiation Act of 1943. Section 403 of the Sixth Supplemental National
Defense Appropriation Act, 1942, Pub. L. 528, 77th Cong., 2d sess., approved April
28, 1942, 56 Stat. L. 226 at 245, as amended by § 801 of the Revenue Act of 1942,
Pub. L. 753, 77th Cong., 2d sess., approved October 21, 1942, 56 Stat. L. 798 at 982;
by the Military Appropriation Act, 1944, Pub. L. 108, 78th Cong., 1st sess.,
approved July 1, 1943, 57 Stat. L. 347 at 347-348; by Pub. L. 149, 78th Cong.,
Ist sess., approved July 14, 1943, 57 Stat. L. 564; and as amended in full by § 701
(b) of the Revenue Act of 1943, Pub. L. 235, 78th Cong., 2nd sess., enacted February
2 5, 1 944·
'
8
See note 5 supra.
9
Subsection (d) (_1) of the 1943 Act.
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secretaries or heads of the War, Navy and Treasury Departments, the
Maritime Com.mission and the four subsidiaries of the Reconstruction
Finance Corporation.10 The War Shipping Administration also had
renegotiating authority.11
With regard to fiscal years ending on or before June 30, 1943
renegotiating authority will still be exercised by these departments
although the final authority to make a determination of excessive profits
is now vested in the Tax- Courts of the United States 12 for these fiscal
years where an agreement had not been made for the elimination of
excessive profits at the time the Revenue Act of 1943 became effective,13
a point which will be more fully discussed hereafter. The powers
conferred upon the War Contracts Price Adjustment Board are effective only in relation to fiscal years which end after June 30, 1943
although the section of the statute establishing this board was effective
February 25, 1944.
What is this board? · It is an administrative agency composed of
one representative each from the War, Navy and Treasury Departments, the Maritime Commission or the War Shipping Administration,
the Reconstruction Finance Corporation and the War Production
Board.14 It has the authority to conduct renegotiation under regulations
which it may promulgate and may delegate its authority to the secretary
of any of the departments named in the act in any way that it deems
desirable. The secretary', in turn, may redelegate this authority in
whole or in part to such officers or agencies as he may designate.15 This
central board was established as the result of the insistence in Congress
that coordination between the departments having renegotiating
authority under the prior act be not a matter of voluntary cooperation
but one of statutory necessity. The War Contracts Price Adjustment
Board, in fact, operates as a central coordinating agency exercising final
authority in the determination of renegotiation policy, and the promulgation of regulations. It is the agency to which Congress looks in the
renegotiation of those fiscal periods ending after June 30, 1943, over
which it exercises authority. The actual operation and conduct of renegotiation, however, is proceeding in much the same way that it did
10

Subsection (a) (I) of the 1942 Act.
For an explanation of how the War Shipping Administration derives its renegotiating authority from certain executive orders, see Steadman, "Legal Aspects of
Renegotiation," 42 M1cH. L. REv. 545 at 549 (1944).
12 Subsection ( e) ( 2) of the I 94 3 Act.
13
February 25, 1944.
14
Subsection (d) (1) of the 1943 Act.
15
Subsection (d) (4) of the 1943 Act.
11

1 944]

RENEGOTIATION

7

before in the sense that the departments, contracts with which are
renegotiable, have been delegated the authority to carry on renegotiation with the contractors through the existing renegotiation boards that
had been established throughout the country.16 The War Contracts
Price Adjustment' Board has retained the authority to review determinations of excessive profits made by the departments not embodied
in agreements and retains for itself the authority to issue regulations
governing the conduct of renegotiation,11 as well as the power to assign
contractors to the departments for renegotiation. And it is only with
respect to those contractors which the board assigns that the delegated
authority may be exercised.
Commencenient of Renegotiation and Filing of Statements
The Renegotiation Act as it stood immediately prior to these
amendments and remaining effective with respect to 1942 fiscal years,
does not specify the procedure to be followed in commencing renegotiation. The secretary of the department concerned is merely directed
to require renegotiation of a contractor or subcontractor who is, in the
opinion of the secretary, realizing excessive profits from his contracts
or subcontracts with the renegotiating agencies.18 The 1943 Act, however, details the method in which the board ( and those agencies to
which the board has delegated its authority) is to begin renegotiation.
A reasonable notice of the time and place for the renegotiation conference is required and this act stipulates that the mailing of a notice
by registered mail "to the contractor or subcontractor shall constitute
the commencement of the renegotiation proceeding." 19 Apparently
these provisions were inserted in an effort to satisfy procedural due
process.
The 1943 Act requires that every contractor wh.o receives or to
whom there accrues in any fiscal year ending after June 30, 1943 an
aggregate amount in excess of $500,000 from renegotiable contracts
or subcontracts must file certain financial statements in the form which
the War Contracts Price Adjustment Board has prescribed.20 In determining whether the contractor must make such a filing, the contracts
and subcontracts exempted pursuant to section (i) of the act which
16 Pursuant to subsection (d) (4) of the 1943 Act. This delegation of authority is
found in Renegotiation Regulations, 821.1; C.C.H. WAR LAW SERVICE~ 5821.1.
17 The War Contracts Price Adjustment Board has issued these regulations known
and cited as "Renegotiation Regulations."
18 Subsection ( c) ( 1) of the I 942 Act.
19
Subsection ( c) (I) of the 1943 Act.
20 Subsection (c) (5) (A) of the 1943 Act.
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provides statutory and administrative exe~ptions must be included.
However, subcontracts as defined in subsection (a) (5) (B) relating
to the employment of agents and brokers may be excluded. With
respect to those subcontracts described in subsection (a) (5) (B), the
person who holds such contracts in excess of $2 5,ooo :111ust also file'
these statements. If the fiscal year is a fractional part of twelve months,
the $500,000 'and $2 5,ooo figures are reduced to the same "fractional
part thereof" for determining whether filing is mandatory. 21 Moreover, if the aggregate amounts received or accrued in any fiscal year
by a contractor or subcontractor "and all persons under the control of
or controlling or under common control with the contractor or subcontractor" are in excess of $500,000, or $25,000 in the case of the subcontracts held by agents or brokers, these statements must be filed. 22
These statements must be filed by the contractor with the board
on or before the first day of the fourth month following the close of
the fiscal year subject to renegotiation. Where a fiscal year ending
after june 30, r943 was closed when the Revenue' Act of r943 became
law, statements were to have been filed by June r, r944.23
Penalties are imposed for a wilful failure to file or furnish information, recor~, data or for making false statements or for furnishing
false and misleading records. 24
Under renegotiation prior to these recent amendments it was the
practice, and so remains regarding r 942 fiscal years, to request of the
contractor certain financial information which would form the basis
· of an opinion as to whether renegotiation ought to be commenc~d in
the case of a particular contractor. Procedure with regard to r943
fiscal years will remain very much the same except that the information
,instead of being submitted to one of the departments will be forwarded
to the War Contracts Price Adjustm~nt Board which, after studying
the case, will send it to one of the renegotiating agencies if excessive
profits seem present with instructions to commence renegotiation. The
r 942 Act holds only one requirement relative to filing statements.
That is with regard to the running of the statute of limitations regarding fiscal years.25 This filing is not mandatory but it provides a way
for the contractor to commence the running of the limitation period
21

Subsection (c) (6) of the 1943 Act.
The criteria for determining control is discussed under the sections of this
article dealing with exempting and exclusionary amendments.
28
Subsection (c) (5) (A) of the 1943 Act.
2 4lbid.'
•
25
Subsection (c) (5) of the 1942 Act.
22
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with respect to aggregate amounts received from renegotiable contracts
and subcontracts during fiscal years ending prior to July I, I 943. In
the case of individual contracts subsection ( c) ( 6) of the I 942 Act
provides for the running of the statute of limitations within one year
after the close of the fiscal year during w.hich the contract or subcontract
was completed or terminated and this limitation period bars the renegotiation of such a contract irrespective of the time when the financial
report is filed. After the mandatory filing is made under the r943
Act,26 renegotiation is then commenced as provided in that act by the
mailing of a notice to the contractor by registered mail.
Conduct of Renegotiation
As has been true in the past, renegotiation continues to be generally
conducted with the contractor by that agency with whom he has had
the preponderance of his renegotiable business during the fiscal period
under review. However, certain types of business have been entirely
assigned to.one agency in an effort to achieve the greatest uniformity of
result. For example, the machine tool industry has been assigned for
renegotiation largely to the RFC Price Adjustment Board.
In the renegotiation of I 942 fiscal years the contractor is asked to
meet with renegotiators with a view to arriving at an agreement for
the elimination of excessive profits but this method of handling a case
was established by administrative regulation rather than statute. The
r943 Act as applied to r943 fiscal years requires, however, that there
be a conference between the contractor and the renegotiating agency
at which an effort shall be made to reach an agreement for eliminating
unreasonable profits. If it is not possible to reach such an agreement
the r943 Act stipulates that an order shall be entered determining the
amount of excessive profits and requiring their elimination. When this
unilateral determination is made the.procedure established in the new
act requires that the contractor receive a notice concerning it by registered mail.27
The I 942 Act permits renegotiation by individual contracts but
this is not true under the r943 Act for years ending after June 30,
I 943. Renegotiation must be conducted with regard to the aggregate
amounts received under contracts or subcontracts held by a contractor
unless the contractor or subcontractor requests and the War Contracts
Board agrees to renegotiation of contracts individually or as two or
26

27

Subsection (e) ( 1) of the 1943 Act.
Subsection (c) ( 1) of the 1943 Act.
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more groups. 28 It is the practice of the renegotiating departments,
under the I 942 Act, to conduct renegotiation with very minor exceptions upon a fiscal year basis. Congress decided to give the contractor the
assurance that this practice would be followed, but at the same time it
provided a means for conducting a renegotiation on other than a
straight fiscal year basis if some such other method is mutually agreeable to the contractor and the Government.
An interesting feature of the I 943 Act is the requirement that
whenever excessive profits are determined for a fiscal year ending after
June 30, 1943, either by way of agreement or by a unilateral order,
the contractor must be furnished, at his request, a statement of the
facts which form the basis for the determination and the reasons for
making it. 29 Two reasons appear for this change in the act. Some
contractors complained that the renegotiation boards were making findings of excessive profits without disclosing the reasons for· their actions
and that the contractor, therefore, had no way of knowing how this
decision was achieved. It also seems likely that this .i~ a further move
to meet the r~quirements of procedural due process. 30 As already mentioned, this statement is to be furnished only upon the request of the
contractor and it does not clearly appear from the statute whether the
contractor in those instances where renegotiation results in an agreement is entitled to receive the- statement before the agreement is
reached. 31 Although the statute strictly construed appears only to
require that the statement be furnished in such cases after the agreement is made, it seems reasonable to believe that Congress intendecl
that the statement be furnished to the contractor prior to the execution
of the agreement so as to assist him in determining whether the renegotiating agencies have given due consideration to all of the aspects
of his case. If the statement were to be furnished only after an agreement had been executed it would probably be. of less assistance in
28

Subsection ( c) ( l) of the l 94 3 Act.
Subsection (c) (1) of the 1943 Act.
30
However, compare Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495,
55 S. Ct. 837 (1935) wherein the court indicated that it was of no consequence that
the National Industrial Recovery Act, Act of June 16, 1933, required that the company be informed of the reasons for the administrators' actions as a constitutional test.
reasons for the administrators' actions as a constitutional test.
31
•
" • • • Whenever the Board makes a determination with respect to the amount of
excessive profits, whether such determination is made by order or is embodied in an
, agreement with the contractor or subcontractor, it shall, at the request of the contractor
· or subcontractor, as the case may be, prepare and furnish such contractor or subcontractor with a statement of such determination, of the facts used as a basis therefor, and of
its reasons for such determination." Subsection (c) (1) of the 1943 Act.
29
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administering the act. It may have been contemplated that such a statement would also serve as a check upon the administrators requiring a
more careful adherence to the law. The War Contracts Price Adjustment Board, believing that the contractor should have this statement
before he signs the agreement if he wishes it, has issued a regulation
which permits its issuance despite the act's failure to clearly require it.82
The Renegotiation Agreement
The provisions of the Renegotiation Act with regard to the :finality
of agreements have not been changed. There are certain differences,
however, with regard to other aspects of renegotiation agreements
made under the 1943 Act for 1943 fiscal years.
In past renegotiations it has been the practice to ask the contractor
to agree to an examination of his prices with a view to price reductions
for the purpose of preventing the creation of excessive profits in the
next succeeding :fiscal period.33 The 1943 Act, however, permits the
inclusion of provisions with respect to "the elimination of excessive
profits likely to be received or accrued," that is, with regard to forward
pricing, as it is known in Government procurement jargon, only with
the consent of the contractor. 34 This is a result of the separation of the
recapture and repricing powers brought about by the Revenue Act of
1943 for :fiscal years after June 30, 1943. The power of pricing for
future deliveries has been separated from renegotiation and placed in
the hands of the procurement agencies through section 8or of the
Revenue Act of 1943-the Repricing of War Contracts Act. The
power to recapture remains encompassed by renegotiation. Since another means is provided for assuring fair prices for the future delivery
of war goods the r 943 Act does not regard forward pricing as_ an
essential feature of the renegotiation processes. However, the policy
of the departments conducting renegotiation remains that they will
seek a forward pricing agreement with the contractor if such is agreeable to him in order to accomplish the objectives of the, Repricing of
War Contracts Act at the same time that renegotiation is conducted.85
The 1943 Act with regard to 1943 fiscal years has somewhat
broadened and made more definite the scope of authority held by the
administrators of the law in that it now specifically provides that the
Renegotiation Regulations 524.1; C.C.H. WAR LAw SERVICE U5524.1.
The clause covering this point appeared to impose no more than a moral obligation and was frequently referred to as the "Boy Scout Clause."
34 Subsection ( c) (I) of the 1943 Act.
35
Renegotiation Regulations 506.2; C.C.H. WAR LAw SERVICE U5506.2.
82

88
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renegotiation agreement may include, in addition to provisions for the
elimination of excessive profits, terms and conditions covering such
other matters relating thereto as the War Contracts Price Adjustment
Board deems advisable. 36 This should facilitate the administration of
the act. Aside from any statutory provisions certain policies have been
established by the administrators concerning provisions which are not
acceptable as a part of the renegotiation agreement. Important among
these is the refusal on the part of the Government to include clauses
in renegotiation agreements which will in any way impair the finality
of the agreement.37 This simply means that the agreement must not
permit its being reopened or altered in the event that the act is amended
or declared unconstitutional or in case an interpretation is changed or
new exemptions are created. Except in two cases no provision calling
for a refund by the Government under any circumstances is to be
allowed. One exception is because of the recomputation of the amorti~tion deduction which is provided in subsection (a) ( 4) (D), and the
other is with respect to the refund for excess inventory profit under
subsection (i)(3), both of these provisions being in the 1943 Act and
retroactive to April, 28, 1942.88
The position has also been taken that the renegotiators should not
ordinarily inclµde in the original agreement provisions for the payment
of interest on installments of the amount to be repaid.39 In the eve~t
of active default by the contractor, however, it is likely that interest
payments will be required.

Provisions for Review
In those cases where there is a failure on the part of the contractor
and the administrators to' agree a unilateral determination will be made
· by the department conducting the renegotiation.40 One of the most
fundamental changes e:ffected through the amendments of the Revenue
Act of 1943 is that providing for an administrative review of such
determinations. The 1942 Act makes no mentio~ of review, either
administrativ~ or judicial. · But with regard to all fiscal years ending
after June 30, 1943, the 1943 Act establishes a procedure whereby the
War Contracts Price Adjustment Board may, on its own motion, initiate
a review of any determination of excessive profits made by any of the
88

Subsection (c)
Renegotiation
88
Renegotiation
89
Renegotiation
40
Renegotiation
87

(1) of th,e 1943 Act.
.
Regulations 507.1; C.C.H.
Regulations 507.2; C.C.H.
Regulations 422.4; C.C.H.
Regulations 821.1; C.C.H.

WAR LAW
WAR,LAw
WAR LAW
WAR LAw

SERVICE
SERVICE
SERVICE
SERVICE

1f
1f
1f
1f

5507.1.
5507.2.
5422.4.
5821.1.
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renegotiating agencies. However, if the board does not initiate a review
within sixty days from the date of the determination then the determination becomes that of the board itself.41
If the contractor decides to request a review of the determination
of excessive profits which has been made by the department conducting
the renegotiation he must do so within sixty days after the d.etermination has been made. The board then has sixty days within which to
initiate such a review and if it is not commenced within that period then
the determination becomes final and is considered to be that of the
board. The power of the board to review cases extends to permit it to
find a greater or a lesser amount or the same amount of excessive
profits as has been determined by the department which has made the
finding. 42
The 1943 Act establishes the Tax Court of the United States as
the final reviewing agency in renegotiation. A contractor, dissatisfied
with the finding of the board for a 1943 fiscal year, may lodge an
appeal with the Tax Court asking for a redetermination of the amount
established by the board. Such a petition for review must be filed
with.in ninety days after the board's determination has been made.48
The Tax Court is also now empowered to make the final determination
of excessive profits with respect to fiscal years ending before July 1,
1943.44 Review of determinations made for such years by this agency
separates itself into two phases. First, where at the time that the
Revenue Act of 1943 became e:ffective a unilateral determination had
been made by the secretary of the department conducting a renegotiation with any contractor, that contractor could file a request with the
Tax Court for a review of such determination at any time within ninety
days after the passage of this act. The time for filing s1:1ch appeals
expired on May 25, 1944 and thirty-six such cases were filed. 45 Sec41
The board will only review unilateral determinations made by the departments
to which the poard has delegated authority. Renegotiation Regulations 821.1; C.C.H.

WAR LAW SERVICE
42

1f 5821.1.

Subsection (d) (5) of the 1943 Act.
48
Subsection (e) (1) of the 1943 Act.
44 Subsection (e) (2) of the 1943 Act. Subcontractors described in subsection (a)
(5) (B) of the 1943 Act (brokers & agents) are not accorded a right to file an appeal
with the Tax Court with respect to a unilateral determination for those fiscal years
ending before July 1, 1943. Subsection (e) (2) of the 1943 Act.
45
Cases now before the U.S. Tax Court relating to renegotiation of fiscal years
ending before June 30, 1943 with regard to which a unilateral det~rmination has been 1
made at the time the Revenue Act of 1943 became effective, are as follows:
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ondly, where renegotiation was not closed at the time the Revenue
Act of I 943 was passed and a unilateral determination is made after
that date, the contractor may take his case to the Tax Court if he files
such an appeal within ninety days after -the determination by the secretary.46 Of course in none of these instances does an appeal lie where
a contractor enters into the renegotiation agreement.
1-R Allen Tool Co. v. Navy Department.
2-R Jack & Heintz, Inc. v. War Department. Has requested a circuit court
hearing in Cleveland.
·
3-R H. E. Wolfe Construction Co., Inc. and J. B. Michel Y. War Department.
Has requested a circuit court hearing in Jacksonville, Fla.
4-R Antonelli Fireworks Co. v. War Department.
5-R Coyne Electrical School, Inc. v. War Department. Has requested a circuit
court hearing in Chicago.
6-R Star Tool & Die Works v. War Department.
7-R Kane Manufacturing Corp. v. War Department. Has requested a circuit
court hearing in Pittsburgh, Pa.
8-R Fischer Special Manufacturing Co. v._ War Department. Has requested a
circuit court hearing in Cincinnati, Ohio.
9-R Aircraft & Diesel Equipment Corp. v. War Department.
10-R National Electric Welding Machines Co. v. \Var Department.
11-R Peninsular Machine Co. v. War Department. Request for hearing in Detroit.
1_2-R Ring Construction Corp. v. War Department.
13-R Crucible Steel Casting Co. v. Navy Department.
14-R C. Wallace v. War Department.
15-R Wanda May Wallace v. War Department.
16-R Sam P. Wallace v. War Department. ·
17-R Bobbie J. Wallace v. War Department.
18-R Frank Wallace v. War Department.
19-R Sue Wallace v. War Department.
20-R The. Wheland Company v. War Department (fiscal year April 30, 1942).
21-R The Wheland Company v. War Department (fiscal year April 30, 1943).
22-R Lord Manufacturing Co. v. War Department.
23-R Stein Brothers Manufacturing Co. v. War Department.
24-R National Grinding Wheel Company v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
25-R Gear Specialties Co. v. War Department. Requests hearing in Chicago.
26-R Psaty and Fuhrman, Inc. v. War Department.
27-R Nathan Cohen v. War Department.
28-R W. B. Knight Machinery Co. v. War Department. Company has made a
request for a Circuit Court hearing in St. Louis, Mo.
29-R Kearney & Trecker Corp. (a Wisconsin corporation) v. Navy Department.
30-R Sale Electric Supply Co. v. War Department.
31-R Standard Pressed Steel Co. v. War Department.
32-R Automatic Screw Products Co., v. War Department.
33-R Pennsylvania Manufacturing Co., Inc. v. 'War Department.
34-R Kellburn Manufacturing Co., Inc. v. War Department.
35-R Phillips Machinery Co. v. War Department.
36-R Auto Specialties Manufacturing Co. v. \Var Department.
46
Subsection ( e) ( 2) of the 1943 Act.
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The Tax Court of the United States is not a court. It is an administrative body. 47 The review, therefore, which the Tax Court conducts
is an administrative review and whether resort thereafter may be had
to the courts is a problem which will be discussed later. Exclusive and
final jurisdiction is conferred upon the Tax Court for reviewing determinations of excessive profits in renegotiation. The Renegotiation
Act does not permit the determinations of the Tax Court to be reviewed
by "any court or agency." 48 The proceeding before the Tax Court is
de novo. It is not restricted to issues presented during prior renegotiation proceedings and the Tax Court is not bound by the amount determined by the board.40 The Tax Court may determine a greater or
lesser amount as constituting excessive profits. 60 The statement required
to be furnished to the contractor upon his request setting forth the
board's basis for making the determination is not binding upon the
Tax Court. In fact the statute does not permit such statement to be
used as proof of facts or of any of the conclusioi:is which it may contain. 51 The powers of the Tax Court are the same irrespective of the
fiscal year which is being reviewed. 52 However, in considering those
fiscal years ending before July 1, 1943, as has been seen, appeals will
be from determinations of the secretary, and the 1942 Act, together
with those sections of the 1943 Act applicable to fiscal years ending
before July 1, 1943, will govern the determinations of the Tax Court,68
whereas the I 943 Act as it relates to I 943 fiscal years will apply to
47 Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716, 49 S. Ct. 499 (1929);
Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489, 64 S. Ct. 239 (1943).
48 Subsection ( e) ( l) of the 1943 Act. This raises a nice question as to whether
an appeal can be taken to the courts from the Tax Court's determination and what
issues, if any, are reviewable there. This is discussed later.
49 Subsection ( e) ( l) of the 194 3 Act.
so Subsection ( e) ( l) of the l 94 3 Act.
51
Subsection ( c) ( l) of the 1943 Act.
52 Subsections ( e) ( l) and ( e) ( 2) of the l 943 Act. Subsection ( e) ( l) provides:
" . . . For the purpose of this subsection the court shall have the same powers
and duties, insofar as applicable, in respect of the contractor, the subcontractor; the
Board and the Secretary, and in respect of the attendance of witnesses and the production of papers, notice of hearings, hearings before divisions, review by the Tax Court of
decisions of divisions, stenographic reporting, and reports of proceedings, as such court
has under sections l II0, l II 1, l II3, II 14, II I 5(a)' l I 16, 11 l 7(a), II 18, Il 20 and
II 21 of the Internal Revenue Code in the case of a proceeding to redetermine a
deficiency. In the case of any witness for the Board or Secretary, the fees and mileage,
and the expenses of taking any deposition shall be paid out of appropriations of the
Board or Department available for that purpose, and in the case of any other witnesses,
shall be paid, subject to rules prescribed by the court, by the party at whose instance the
witness appears or the deposition is taken."
53
Subsection (e) (2) of the 1943 Act.
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the Tax Court's consideration of cases which come before it involving
those fiscal yea,rs. It should be emphasized again that an appeal to
the Tax Court is provided only in those instances where no agreement
has been entered into between the contractor and the Government with
respect to renegotiation. This principle applies irrespective of the fiscal
years involved.
Although the contractor may file a petition with the Tax Court
appealing from a determination of the board, he remains under obligation to pay to the Government the amount of excessive profits determined by the board while his case is pending in the.Tax Court. His
filing this petition does not stay the execution of the board's order. Gi
Since this is so, suppose the contractor pays the amount of excessive
profits determined by the board while his case is pending with the
Tax Court and thereafter the Tax Court redetermines the amount of
excessive profits finding a smaller amount than the contractor has
already paid, how can the contractor recover this overpayment? The
Renegotiation Act m,Ftkes no provision for refund in such a case. Apparently the problem was never presented to Congress, for an examinaJ
G4 Subsection ( e) ( l) of the 1943 Act, Subsection ( e) ( 2) of the 194 3 Act
relates to the Tax Court review of the secretaries' determinations for 1942 years. It is
not clear that an appeal to the Tax Court from an order of the secretary as provided by
this subsection is also effective to stay the execution of the secretary's order. The act
provides that upon appeal to the Tax Court from an order of the secretary the Tax
Court "shall have the same jurisdiction, powers, ,and duties, and the proceeding shall
be subject to the same provisions, as in the case of a petition filed with the court under
paragraph (1) ••.." Subsection (e) (2) of the 1943 Act. The senstence in paragraph ( l) relative here reads:
" ... The filing of a petition under this subsection shall not operate to stay the
execution of the order of the Board under subsection (c) (2)." (Italics supplied).
Subsection (e) ( 1) of the 194 3 Act.
It will be noted that the word "Board" is used here and that subsection {c) (2)
is mentioned which is only applicable in the 1943 Act and therefore applies only to
fiscal years ending after June 30, 1943. Moreover, paragraph (1) referred to in the
quotation above in expressing the powers and duties of the Tax Court refers to both
the board and the secretary in relation to the procedure before the Tax Court itself.
(See note 53, supra.) This part of the act immediately precedes the statement that the
filing of the petition shall not act as a stay to the execution of the board's order. Inasmuch as the board and the secretary are specifically adverted to in this section it may
be argued that, if Congress had intended the secretary's order to be executed while the
contractor's petition was pending in the Tax Court, it might ,have specifically so stated.
Contrary to such a contention it must be recognized that the provision in§ 403 (e) (2)
directing that in the case of 1942 fiscal year appeals "the proceeding shall be subject to
the same provisions" as apply to appeals to the Tax Court for 1943 fiscal years, seems to
carry with it an implication that the provision quoted above prohibiting a stay of the
board's order also applies in the case of petitions from determinations for 1942 fiscal
years which are made by the secretary.
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tion of the Congressional Debates and the Committee Reports with
regard to the I 943 Revenue Bill reveals no mention of this kind of
case.ss The Vinson-Trammel Act/ 0 which preceded the Renegotiation
Act as a profit limitation measure, made express provision to cover
specifi~ally situations similar to this. It provided:
" ... that if such amount [ excess profits] is not voluntarily
paid, the Secretary of the Treasury shall collect the same under
the usual methods imposed under the Internal Revenue Laws to
collect said income taxes: Provided further, That all provisions
of law (including penalties) applicable with respect to the taxes
imposed by Title I of the Revenue Act of 1934, ... shall be
applicable with respect ... to refunds by the Treasury of overpayments of excess profits into the Treasury." s7
Section 322(d) of the Internal Revenue Code which provides for
refund of overpayments found by the Tax Court does not overcome
this difficulty. Section 322 is relative to refunds for overpayments of
taxes to taxpayers. The powers conferred upon the Tax Court by the
Renegotiation Act under sections of the Internal Revenue Code all
relate to matters of procedure and practice in the Tax Court and do
not relate to collections or refunds of taxes. The Renegotiation Act
itself provides its own methods of collection but it makes no provisions
to recover a refund of overpayment in the circumstances under discussion. It would seem, therefore, that the jurisdiction of the Tax
Court extends only to the determination of the amount, if any, of
excessive profits. 58 The Tax Court is confined to a determination of
ss It may be that Congress assumed that a refund would be available to the contractor in case of an overpayment resulting from a favorable decision of the Tax Court.
In the debates upon the Revenue Bill of 1943, H.R. 3687, Representative Disney of
Oklahoma said:
''When the contractor appeals to the Tax Court, there is no stay of the recapture
of the money but, of course, a decision by the Tax Court in his favor wo~ld entitle him
to a refund of amounts'that had been recaptured." 89 CoNG. REc., No. 185, dated
November 30, 1943, pp. 1025 l and 10252.
Nonetheless the Renegotiation Act failed to provide a mechanism for granting
such refund.
so Act of March 27, 1934, 48 Stat. L. 505; amended Act of June 25, 1936, 49
Stat. L. 1926, and Act of April 3, 1939, 53 Stat. L. 555 at § 14, p. 560; 34 U.S.C.
(1940) § 496.
ST 34 u.s.c. (1940) § 496(b).
ss See Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Gooch Milling & Elevator Co., 320
U.S. 418, 64 S. Ct. 184 (1943). The Board of Tax Appeals (predecessor of the Tax
Court) had no jurisdiction to order a refund or credit for tax overpayments, but was
limited to the determination of the amount of the deficiency or overpayment. See
United States ex rel. Girard Trust Company v. Helvering, 301 U. S. 530, 57 S. Ct.
855 (1937).
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excessiv~ profits from which an overpayment may result but it appears
to have no power to ..order a refund of an overpayment. 59 The act
establishes the machinery for collection of an additional amount of
excessive profits should the Tax Court's determination be higher than
that of the.board, 60 but it remains silent as to how a refund of an overpayment may be accomplished. If the contractor is to recover the
amount of overpayment· it would seem that he would have to look
elsewhere. He would have to look beyond the Renegotiation Act
itself. The probable route that would be available to him for the
recovery of this sum would be by the presentation of the claim to the
General Accounting Office and appeal therefrom, if necessary, to the
Court of Claims. This would be upon the theory that the overpayment
was an amount erroneously received and covered into the Treasury.61
It is difficult, however, to believe that Congress intended such a result.
This is the kind. of thing to which section 322(d) of the Internal
Revenue Code, which provides for refunds of overpayments as determined by the Tax Court, should apply. Certainly no remedy has been
provided through this means, but it is a matter which Congress might
well take under consideration for remedial action.62 Under the present
law, even if the administrators of the act should wish to d~fer collec59

Ibid.
Subsection (c) (2) of the 1943 Act.
61
Revised Statutes, § ·236 provides that "all claims and demands whatever by the
Government of the United States or against it, and all accounts,whatever in :which the
Government of the United States is concerned, either as. debtor or creditor, shall be
settled and adjusted in the General Accounting Office." 31 U.S.C. (1940) § 71; Act
of June 10, 1921, c. 18, § 305; 42 Stat. L. 24. Upon presentation of the claim in the
General Accounting Office and its allowance, the refund presu~ably would. be made
from funds appropriated to meet expenditures under the account on the books of the
Government designated "Refunds of Moneys Erroneously Received and Covered." 3 I
U.S.C. ( l 940) '§ 72 5q. Excessive profits repaid by the contractor under the Renegotiation Act of 1943 are directed to "be covered into the Treasury as miscellaneous
receipts" (§ 403 (c) ( 2)) and would, therefore, appear to be contemplated by the
foregoing appropriation. The statute, 31 U.S.C. (1940) § 725q, provides that the
"Secretary of the Treasury shall submit with his annual estimates of appropriations an
amount necessary to meet expenditures properly chargeable to this account."
If no appropriation should be available, then the Comptroller General would be
required to submit the claim for refund of the overpayment "to the Congress by a
special report containing the material facts and his recommendations thereon."
62 As to the possibility of an action at common law to recover this overpayment
in renegotiation see Stone v. White, 301 U. S. 532 at 534, 57 S. Ct. 851 (1937).
There the Court pointed out that an action under the statute to recover a tax erroneously paid or overpaid through an action at law is in fact equitable in its nature being
the lineal successor of the common count indebitatus assumpsit for money had and
received.
60
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tions while a Tax Court review is pending, it is extremely doubtful
that they have the authority to· do so, for Congress has specifically
directed that excessive profits be eliminated and has provided the means
for so doing and has, moreover, stipulated that the filing of a petition
with the Tax Court appealing from a determination of excessive profits
shall not act to stay the execution of the board's order.

Statute of Limitations
When renegotiation was originally enacted it had no provisions for
a limitation period. 'rhis objection was remedied by the amendments
of October 21, 1942 whereby section 801 of the Revenue Act of 1942 68
amended the original law by adding a provision prohibiting the renegotiation of any contract unless such renegotiation was commenced
within one year after the close of the fiscal year in which such contract
or subcontract was completed or terminated.6 " These provisions are
still applicable to all fiscal years ending before July 1, 1943. They
remain part of the 1942 Act. Under this act it is also possible for the
contractor to start the running of the statute of limitations by the filing
of certain financial statements with the secretaries of the departments
for any prior fiscal years and, unless the secretary of the department
concerned gives notice of the commencement of the renegotiation within
one year after the date of the filing of these statements and actually
commences the renegotiation procedure within sixty days thereafter,
the contractor is relieved from the obligation to renegotiate for the
periods which are covered by the filed statement. 65
These limitation provisions have undergone considerable alteration.
New limitation periods applicable to fiscal years ending after June 30,
1943 are based upon the mandatory filing of financial data required
with regard to each such fiscal year subject to renegotiation. 66 Renegotiation proceedings with regard to these fiscal years must be commenced
within twelve months after the close of the fiscal period concerned or
within twelve months from the date of the filing of the mandatory
statements, whichever date is later. If the proceedings are not so commenced, then the contractor is discharged with regard to any liability
63 Pub. L. 753, 77th Cong., 2d sess., approved October 21, 1942, 56 Stat. L.
798 at 982.
6
" Subsection (c) (6) of § 403 of the Sixth Supplemental National Defense Appropriation Act as amended by § 801 of the Revenue Act of 1942, Pub. L. 753, 77th
Cong., 2d sess., approved October 21, 1942, 56 Stat. L. 798 at 982.
65
Subsection (c) (5) of the 1942 Act.
66
Subsection (c)(5)(A) of the 1943 Act.
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to renegotiate on account of the fiscal year which the statement covers.
After notice is given commencing renegotiation an agreement or order
which determines the amount of e~cessive profits realized by the company involved must be made within one year: In other words, the
renegotiation, once started, must be completed within a year either by
agreement or by an order of the board or the· agency to which the board
has delegated its authority for the conduct of the renegotiation. When
the limitation periods expire, the contractor is discharged from all
liability for excessive profits for those fiscal periods which would otherwise have been subject to the act. 67
_
There are two exceptions to which this limitation period does not
apply. If a unilateral determination is made by one of the renegotiating
agencies a review of that determination by the board will not be-barred
because the period has passed whereby the limitation would otherwise
become effective. Moreover, the one-year period of limitation may
be extended by agreement between the contractor and the Govern- ment.68
Duration of Renegotiation
Before amended by the Revenue Act of 1943, the Renegotiation
Act was to continue in effect during the period of the war and three
years thereafter. 69 The statute now provides that profits received or
accrued after December 31, 1944 will not be subject to renegotiation,
unless the authority which has been granted to the President, to extend
the operation of this law to a time not later than June 30, 1945 is
exercised. 10 This authority conferred upon the President permits him
to extend. the operation of renegotiation to the date just mentioned if
not later than December 1, 1944 he determines that competitive conditions have not been restored. However, the President is also given
the authority, shquld he extend renegotiation, to determine at a time
not later than June 30, 1945 that competitive conditions were restored
at any time within the six month.s prior thereto and, by so proclaiming,
renegotiation would not be operative after the date which the President
may set within that period.1 f
67

Subsection (c) (3) of the 1943 Act.
Subsection (c) (3) of the- 1943 Act.
69 Subsection (h) of the 1942 Act.
70 Subsection (h) of the 1943 Act.
71 These provisions for ~e extension of renegotiation by conferring upon the
President authority which he may exercise, if competitive conditions are absent, further
emphasize that Congress regards the Renegotiation Law as a wartime necessity because
of the absence of competitive forces.
68
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EXEMPTING AND EXCLUSIONARY AMENDMENTS

Exemptions by Statute

The Renegotiation Act creates an exemption measured by a contractor's dollar volume of s~les during a fiscal year directly or indirectly
to the renegotiating departments. In determining whether a contractor
falls within this exemption certain sales which are actually non-renegotiable because of other exemptions are included in computing the
aggregate of receipts and accruals, a point which will later be discussed
in detail. The Renegotiation Act as it applies to all fiscal years ending
before July 1, 1943, excludes from the area of its operation contractors
whose total sales computed in the foregoing manner do not exceed
$rno,ooo during a fiscal year.72 This figure of $rno,ooo has now been
increased to $500,000 in the 1943 Act. 78 The objective of this was to
reduce the renegotiation load by eliminating those smaller businesses
whose realization of excessive profits would not essentially affect the
war economy. In cases where a fiscal year is but a fractional part of
twelve months, in applying this exemption of $500,000, and that of
$25,000 wh;ch obtains in the case of subcontractors defined in subsection (a) ( 5) (B) of the Renegotiation Act relating to the renegotiation of fees received by agents and brokers, these figures will be reduced
"to the same fractional part." 74 Thus, if the fiscal period under consideration is but six months, the exemption measured by the amount of
renegotiable business would be $250,000 and $12,500.
The interpretation of this $500,000 exemption raises four important considerations. What contracts are to be considered in determining
its application? Does the act permit a recapture of excessive profits to
the extent that when deducted from the total gross income of the
contractor the result will be an amount of gross income less than
$500,000 or less than $25,000 in the case of subcontractors who are
agents and brokers? What is the effect of this exemption in the case
of fiscal periods of less than twelve months? How is it applied with
relation to an affiliated group within the meaning of section 141 ( d) of
the Internal Revenue Code where the fiscal periods of the respective
members of the group differ?
With regard to the first problem as to what contracts are to be
considered in applying this exemption: Contracts exempted through
72

Subsection ( c) ( 6) of the 1942 Act.

78

Subsection (c) (6) of the 1943 Act.

74

Subsection (c) (6) of the 1943 Act.
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subsection (i) of the 1943 Act7 5 are to be included in making the
computation to ascertain whether $500,000 has been received or accrued from renegotiable contracts during a fiscal year. To be excluded,
however, are the brokers' and agents' contracts described in subsection
(a) (5) (B). To ascertain whether the amount received or accrued
under such subcontracts during any fiscal year exceeds $25,000, the
computation will also be made by including sales which are otherwise
exempted by the provisions of subsection (i) of the act. The fact,
however, that receipts from contracts and subcontracts which are exempted by the provisions· of the act are included for determining
whether a contractor is subject to renegotiation or not does not mean
that the exempted items can be considered in determining whether excessive profits have been realized by a contractor. Items that are
exempted from renegotiation cannot be taken into consideration and
are not subject to the operation of the act in any other regard save that
they are included for the purpose of applying these exemptions relating
to the dollar volume of business.
All renegotiable amounts received by persons "under the control
of' or controlling or under common control with the contqtctor or subcontractor" 76 must be lumped together in deciding whether a contractor
is exempted from renegotiation for having less than $500,000 of sales. 77
As an example of control under the established regulations, if the A
corporation holds more than fifty per cent of the voting stock in the B
75 Although this discussion relates to the 1943 fiscal ,years the same principles
apply witli. respect to this problem as those which obtain with respect to the $100,000
exemption under subsection (c) (6) of the 1942 Act for 1942 fiscal years.
·
76
Subsection ( c) ( 6) of the I 94 3 Act.
77 The tests of control established by the War Contracts Price Adjustment Board
are set forth in the Renegotiation Regulations at paragraph 348.4, found in C.C.H.
WAR LAW SERVICE 1f 5348.4, as follows:
"In determining whether the contractor controls or is controlled by or under
common control with another person, the following principles should be followed:
"(1) Corporate Control: A parent corporation which owns more than 5oo/o of
the voting stock of another corporation controls such other corporation and also controls
all corporations controlled by such other corporation.
"(2) Individual Control: An individual who owns more than 5oo/o of the voting stock of a corporation controls the corporation and also controls all corporations
controlled by the corporation.
"(3) Partnership Cntrol: A general partner who is entitled to more than 5oo/o
of the profits of a partnership controls the partnership.
"(4) Joint Venture Control: A joint venturer who is entitled to more than 5oo/o
of the profits of a joint venture controls the joint venture.
"(5) Other Cases: Actual control is a question of fact. Whenever it is believed
that actual control exists even though the foregoing conditions are not fulfilled, the
matter may be determined by the Department or Service conductin2: the re.,e_gotiation."
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corporation which in turn holds more than fifty per cent of the voting
stock in the C, D and E companies and the total renegotiable sales of
these corporations is in excess of $500,000 including for this purpose
the exempted sales defined in subsection (i) of the act, the A company
is subject to renegotiation even though its renegotiable total sales for
the purpose of applying this exemption are only $50,000.
It does not appear possible under the I 943 Act for the boards to
determine an amount of excessive profits which when deducted from
the total gross income of the contractor will leave an amount less than
78
$500,000 or less than $25,000 in the case of agents or brokers.
In
case a fractional fiscal period is involved in renegotiation these amounts
will be regarded proportionately.79
Renegotiation is frequently undertaken with affiliated groups, parent and subsidiary corporations, on a consolidated basis. The problem
occurs as to how the $500,000 exemption is to be applied where the
fiscal years of the various members of the group differ. This illustration
will answer the point. Assume the group consists of a parent and two
subsidiaries. Control of the subsidiaries rests with the parent. Assume
further that the application of the exemption is being made to the
parent. The fiscal year of the parent is a calendar year. The fiscal year
of the first subsidiary begins October r and ends September 30, while
the fiscal year for the second subsidiary begins on April r and ends
March 3 r. If, during the parent company's fiscal year, both the parent
and its subsidiaries received amounts from contracts and subcontracts
subject to renegotiation including those exempted under subsection (i),
as already discussed, in excess of $500,000, then the affiliated group
falls within the purview of the act and is subject to renegotiation. And
if their receipts from those subcontracts as defined in subsection
(a)(s)(B) of the act for the parent's fiscal year exceed $25,000, then
the group is subject to renegotiation both with regard to the amounts
received as fees or commissions under subsection (a) ( 5) (B) of the act
and other receipts from renegotiable business. 80
The I 942 Act provides an exemption of contracts made by one of
the renegotiating departments with any other department, bureau or
agency of the Government, with states or local political subdivisions or
with foreign governments.81 This exemption is included in the 1943
78

Renegotiation Regulations 348.3; C.C.H. WAR LAW SERVICE

79

Subsection {c) (6) of the 1943 Act.

80

Renegotiation Regulations 348.2; C.C.H. WAR LAW SERVICE

81

Subsection (i) (1) (i) of the 1942 Act.

1f
1f

5348-35348.2.
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Act. 82 Moreover, the exemption relative to contracts and subcontracts
for th~ products of mines, oil or gas wells, mineral deposits and the
like and with relation to timber which has not been treated beyond the
first form suitable for industrial use is retained in the la:w.88 Under
the 1942 Act Congress authorizes the departments to exempt agricultural products 84 and regulations have been issued which extend this
exemption to many farm products. 85 Apparently Congress wanted to
82

Subsection (i) (1) (A) of the 1943 Act.
The Senate Committee on Finance commented favorably upon the interpretation which the secretaries had given this exemption under the l 942 Act. This
congressional recognition should be helpful in the administration of this exempth1g
provision. The text of both the 1942 and 1943 Acts in this respect is the same. The
Senate Committee on Finance in reporting the 1943 Revenue Bill said:
"It has been brought to the attention of the committee that the interpretation of
the exemption of products of a mine, oil or gas well, or other mineral or natural,deposits,
or timber, which have not been processed, refined, or treated beyond the first form
or state suitable for industrial use, as made by the departments whose contracts were
originally made subject to renegotiation, has been questioned both by representatives of
industry and by representatives of other departments of the Government. There has
been suggested on the one hand that the state at which the exemption should have been
applied was at a point closer to the depletion· line and, on the other hand, certain
representatives of industry have taken the position that the exempt status of certain
other products has been set at a state prior to the first form or state at which the same
were suitable for industrial use. After consideration of the published regulations and
exemptions of the departments in connection with this provision of the law, it was
concluded that the application thereof which had been adopted by the departments was
appropriate and within the limits of the discretion vested in the departments by the
Congress to define, interpret, and apply this provision of the statute. Consequently,
this section has been reenacted in its original form and, at the suggestion of the de.:.
partments, there has been added a provision expressly authorizing the making of
appropriate cost allowances in the case of an integrated producer who processes an
exempted product up to and beyond the first form or state suitable for industrial use
in order to place such producer in a position comparable with that of other producers
who sell such products at the exempt stage." S. Rep. No. 627 on H.R. 3687, 78th
Cong., 1st sess., December 22, 1943, pp. 35-36, 1f 13 (Committee on Finance).
The list of exempted products is defined in Renegotiation Regulation~ 841;
C.C.H. WAR LAW SERVICE 1f 5841. Note that tlie products listed in this regulation
are exempt only when they represent products of a mine, oil or gas well, or other
mineral or natural deposit, or timber, which have not been processed, refined or
treated beyond the first form or state suitable for industrial use and are not exempt if
manufactured from raw materials which do not fall within the above description or
which have at some prior stage been processed, refined or treated beyond such first
form or state suitable for industrial use. For example, magnesium products derived
from sea water, products manufactured from the atmosphere, secondary aluminum pigs
· and ingots, and other similar products are not considered exempted products. Renegotiation Regulations 841 (3); C.C.H. WAR LAw SERVICE 1f 5841.
8
' Subsection (i) (z) (ii) of the 1942 Act.
85
•
War Department Procurement Regulations, 1f 1292; 2 C.C.H. WAR LAw
SERVICE 1f 23,372.
88
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be certain that there would be no attempt to renegotiate the farmers
so the amendments to the Revenue Act of r943 exempt specific agricultural commodities and extend to contracts for agricultural products
in their "raw or natural state." 86 This exemption is made retroactive
to April 28, r942, and thus obtains to all fiscal years.
Charitable organizations such as are defined in section IOI ( 6) of
the Internal Revenue Code are exempted from renegotiation as of
April 28, r942 through the amendments made by the Revenue Act of
r943.81
An interesting problem accompanies both of these exemptions.
Renegotiation with certain contractors may have resulted in a determip.ation of excessive profits in instances where the contractor's income
included amounts received from the sale of these now exempted commodities. But there appears to be no provision-----aside from the one
relating to the increment in value of excess inventory 88 which will be
discussed later-which would permit the contractor to recover any of
the amounts which he has paid or has agreed to pay as excessive profits.
It may be that this apparent omission from the statute will be of considerable importance especially to growers of cotton, tobacco and sugar
cane and to dealers in wool. 89 If these producers have entered into renegotiation agreements providing for the return of excessive profits
determined upon the basis of a contractor's income which included the
amount derived from the sales of these commodities, it appears. that
they are without recourse either to recover any amounts so paid or to be
relieved from the obligation of their contract to continue payments.
The law provides no method for reopening such agreements under
these circumstances. Where, however, renegotiation agreements have
not been made then the renegotiation must be conducted by the secretaries of the departments, by the board and Tax Court with the amounts
received from the sale of these exempted items excluded from income
in determining the existence of excessive profits.
Salutary among the exemptions of the r943 Act is that which directs that the act shall not apply to "(E) any contract with a Department, awarded as a. result of competitive bidding, for the construction
of any building, structure, improvement, or facility." 90 This particuSubsection (i) · {1) ( C) of the 194 3 Act.
Subsection (i) (1) (D) of the 1943 Act.
88
Under subsection (i) (3) of the 1943 Act.
89
The processors of meats and poultry as well as dealers in certain other farm
products were exempted by administrative order which is permitted by the 1942 Act.
See note 86 supra.
90
S'ee note 87 supra.
Subsection (i) (1) (E) of the 1943 Act.
86
87

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

lar portion of the new law is effective only with regard to fiscal years
ending after June 30, 1943. Moreover, it should be noted that it applies only to contracts directly with the renegotiating departments and
does not relate to subcontracts. However, this distinction seems to be
of no importance because subcontracts for the improvement to real
estate, such as appear to be contemplated by this subsection of the act,
are exempted by the definition of "subcontract" itself which applies
only to personal property and not to realty in the sense that the Renegotiation Act intends. Real estate as exempted by the inference which
arises from the definition of "subcontract" 91 implies something in the
nature of constructing rather tha:q assembling an object and the meaning of the term "real estate" in the act is not based upon concepts which
govern the local laws of fixtures. 92
Two questions of interpretation are presented here. The term
"facility" as used in this exemption has given rise to some uncertainty
as to its meaning. It is argued that the term properly interpreted embraces machinery and equipment as well as the construction of buildings. This position perhaps is founded upon the use of the word
"facility"· by the procurement agencies in making what are known as
"facility contracts." There the term "facility" is used to mean a contract for the furnishing of machinery and equipment, or a contract for
the construction of a building alone. The procurement agencies, during
this war, have also used the term "facility" in referring to a particular
company. But the term as used in the Renegotiation Act appears to be
limited to instances involving construction work and not merely to the
bringing in of finished items (machinery), or the assembly of items on
the premises where the bulk of the fabrication has been completed elsewhere. The term in the context of the act is related to the words "for
the construction of any building, structure, improvement, or facility" 03
and it must be assumed that it takes its meaning from the generic standard established by the other terms associated with it. It seems quite
evident that Congress intended that this exemption relate only to construction contracts which are "for the constriection of buildings, structures, improvements or facilities." (Italics supplied).
The Senate Committee on Finance in reporting the Revenue Bill
of 1943 stated:
91

Subsection (a) (5) of the 1943 Act.
Steadman, "Legal Aspects of Renegotiation," 42 M1cH. L. REv. 545 at 577,
580 (1944).
93
Subsection (i) (1) (E} of the 1943 Act.
92
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"Your committee bill also exempts contracts with a department
which are awarded after advertisement and as a result of competitive bidding for the construction of buildings, structures, improvements, or facilities. It is believed that in the case of prices established as a result of such advertisement and competitive bidding
there will be no need for further revision under renegotiation and
therefore such contracts should be exempt." 9 "'
"Your committee has added to paragraph (I) of subsection
(i), as amended by the House bill, a new subparagraph (G),
under which the provisions of the section are not to apply toany contract with a Department, awarded as a result of competitive bidding, for the construction of any building, structure, improvement, or facility.
"The renegotiation of such contracts has been found especially
troublesome in certain cases and it is the opinion of the committee
that construction work has,reached the stage where the freedom
of new contracts from the provisions of the statute will not be
prejudicial to the public interest." 95
This emphasizes the fact that Congress was considering this exemption as relating to items of construction and not to items which were
already assembled before they were furnished to a contractor or which
were largely prefabricated and the essential nature of the work to be
done was more in the character of an assembly operation than that of
actually constructing an item largely from materials which do not of
necessity result in one shape or form when the materials or component
parts of the object are put together.96
The foregoing statements of the Senate Committee raise another
question, however, whether advertising is a necessary adjunct to the
presence of competition with regard to the award of contracts of this
nature. It appears that Congress had in mind that competition with
regard to these construction contracts had to be evidenced by advertising. The question then raised is just what is meant by advertising?
Prior to the enactment of the First War Powers Act in I 941,97 it was
required that government contracts be awarded as a result of advertising but this requisite was generally considered to have been satisfied
94

S. Rep. No. 627, on H.R. 3687, 78th Cong., 1st sess., December 22, 194-3,

1f 9 (Committee on Finance).
95 Id. at P· 103, 1f 9.

p. 35,

96
It will be noted that the treatment of this problem is closely analogous to the
exemption of real estate as brought out by the definition of "subcontract" and "article"
in subsections (a) (5) and (6) of the 1943 Act.
97
Act of December 18, 1941, 55 Stat. L. 838 at title II,§ 201, p. 839.
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when it appeared that the contract was awarded after the opportunity
to bid had been made available to several qualified bidders. Advertising has not been construed as necessarily requiring insertion of invitations or notice of invitations to bid on contracts in newspapers or other
publications.
The War Contracts Price Adjustment Board has adopted an interpretation which construes the word "advertisement" to mean "published advertising or such other solicitation for bids as had opened the
bidding to all probable bidders under the circumstances of the particular
case. 'Ail probable bidders' should be deemed to include all qualified
bidders who could have been reasonably expected to bid on a job of the
size, character and loc~tion concerned." 98 The administrators of the
act do not require that a contract have been awarded as the result of
published advertising for this exemption to become operative. It also
appears that there are circumstances under which only one bid is received upon which the contract is awarded and yet the requirements of
this exemption will be satisfied. These instances, however, are going
to be the exception rather than the rule and will be given especial attention by the board.99
A further statutory exemption is provided by subsection (i) (I) (F)
which removes from the sphere of renegotiation "any subcontract,
directly or indirectly under a contract or subcontract to which this section does not apply by reason of this paragraph." The effect of this is to
exempt all subcontracts of whatever tier which fall under a prime contract which is removed from the operation of renegotiation by one or
more of the statutory exemptions. This subsection operates only to
exempt contracts that are specifically exempted by statute and not those
exempted by administrative action as is permitted under subsection (i)
(4.) of th.e 1943 Act. This puts into effect by statute what was unquesRenegotiation Regulations 346.2; C.C.H. WAR. LAw SERVICE 1f 5346.2.
The interpretation of the word "advertisement" adopted by the War Contracts
Price Adjustment Board on June 30, 1944 is as follows:
"RR 346.2 (1) (a) and (b)
"a. As used herein 'advertisement' shall be interpreted as meaning published
advertisi11g or such other solicitation for bids as had opened the bidding to all probable
bidders under the circumstances of the particular case. 'All probable bidders' should
be deemed to include all qualified bidders who could have been reasonably expected
to bid on a job of the size, character, and location concerned.
"b. The determination, with respect to any contract of the type included under
subparagraph ( 1) as to whether or not there was 'advertisement' as defined above ·shall
be made by the Department conducting the renegotiation of such co1:1tract."
See also Renegotiation Regulations 346.2; C.C.H. WAR LAW SERVICE 1f 5346.2.
98

99
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tionably the proper interpretation of the r942 Act.100 This exemption is
made retroactive to April 28, r942. 101
.
The board is authorized to issue regulations which interpret and
apply all of these statutory exemptions with the exception of that which
places charitable organizations outside the scope of renegotiation. The
board is also authorized to interpret the meaning of "standard commercial article" for which administrative exemption is permissible as
will soon be discussed. 102 The board must make its interpretations for
applying these exemptions "by regulationmos and this has been done.10'
The authority of the board to issue these regulations relates only to
fiscal years ending after June 30, r943. With respect to all prior fiscal
years the authority of the secretaries as provided in the I 942 Act remains unaltered.
The definition of subcontract which exempts certain agreements
from renegotiation has not been changed except in the respect that it
expressly excludes agreements for the furnishing of office supplies.105
This exemption is operative for fiscal years ending after June 30, r943.
Office supplies are interpreted a~ not including office furniture and other
non-expendable items such as typewriters, calculators and the like.106

Exclusion of Profits Which Arise From An Increment In Value
of Excess Inventory
Certain companies frequently purchase inventory in excess of what
is necessary for fulfilling their present contracts and orders. Where
such inventory is composed of items exempted by the provisions of subsection (i) (r) (B) or (C) of the r943 Act relating to mineral and natural deposits etc. not refined or treated beyond the first form suitable
Speaking of the laws that existed before the changes brought about By the
Revenue Act of 1943 this writer said:
" ••• when the prime contract itself is exempted by the statute that exemption
acts as an umbrella for all subcontracts made under it and they are also exempted.
Subcontracts made under prime contracts which are exempted by the discretionary
acts of the secretaries are not, however, protected. From the standpoint of statutozy
construction this interpretation seems sound. Since the secretaries are specifically
authorized to exempt both prime contracts and subcontracts, it would seem that exemptions granted by administrative order should apply only to the particular contracts
to which they are given." Steadman, "Legal Aspects of Renegotiation," 42 MICH.
L. REv. 545 at 577 (1944). '
101
Subsection (i) (1) (1:) of the 1943 Act.
102
Subsection (i) (2) of the 1943 Act.
108 Ibid.
·
10
~ Renegotiation Regula"tions, 340 et. seq.
105
Subsection (a) (5) (A) of the 1943 Act.
106
Renegotiation Regulations 334.4; C.C.H. WAR LAw SERVICE 1T 5334.4.
100
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for industrial use or consists of exempted agricultural commodities re- '
moved from the scope of renegotiation, the act, for all fiscal years,
operates to exclude from the determination of excessive profits any
profit arising from the "increment in value of the excess inventory,"
which the contractor receives from renegotiable sales. 101 In other words,
where an excess of inventory of these exempted categories has been
purchased and held by the contractor, any profit which inures to the
contractor from renegotiable contracts as the result of the increase in
value ,of this inventory must be, excluded from consideration in determining whether the company has realized excessive profits. Congress
thus ·chose to regard the increment i11 value of the excess inventory as a
long-term gain similar to gains arising from other long-term investments. The reasons for this stem from the fact that the contractor could
have realized a profit exempt from renegotiation at any time by selling
the inventory at its appreciated prices, repurchasing it at the increased
cost and charging such costs against renegotiable income during the year
when the excess inventory was used for the performance of renegotiable
contracts. This treatment of the increment in value of such inventory
does not penalize the contractor who has made pm;ch~ses at a prior time
and does not encourage contractors to engage in selling and repurchasing so as to create a non-renegotiable profit. This procedure, moreover,
results in according substantially the same treatment to those who purchased these exempted products in excess of their requirements whether
they are integrated or non-integrated producers.
'
Removal of the increment in value of excess inventory from consideration in renegotiation is of particular significance in the textile field
where it is usually the practice to purchase in excess of current requirements. It does not appear to have the same importance, however, in the
heavy industries for there the purchase of exempted products in. the
nature of ore, ingot, pig-iron and the like is largely restricted to quarterly requirements imposed by the War Production Board through the
operation of the Controlled Materials Plan. It is also true that there is
available to integrated producers a fair cost allowance where inventory
is purchased below rather than at the exempt· level and treated or
refined by such producers beyond its non-exempt stage. This treatment
is assured through other provisions of the act. 108
The methods for excluding such profits from consideration in re10

•

ios

Subsection (i) (3) of the 1943 Act.
lbid.
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negotiation are to be in accordance with the regulations prescribed by
the War Contracts Price Adjustment Board and extensive regulations
with regard to this subsection of the act have been issued.100 As noted
before, this portion of the statute is retroactive to April 28, r942 and
has the same effect as though it were part of the original law.
The act provides for a refund or credit to be given to contractors in
those cases where renegotiation of a fiscal year ending before July r,
r943 occurred before the enactment of the Revenue Act of 1943.110
And, insofar as the increment in value of the excess inventory was considered in arriving at the amount of excessive profits in the renegotiation
of such a year, a refund will be made. This refund is available if the
renegotiation was completed prior to the date of the enactment of the
Revenue Act of r 943 irrespective of whether the determination is embodied in an agreement. But it is available only to the extent that it
arises from renegotiable business and only insofar as it does not exceed
the amount of excessive profits determined for the fiscal year concerned.
Moreover, in order to obtain the refund the contractor must have filed
a claim therefor with the secretary of the department conducting the
renegotiation within ninety days from February 2 5, r 944. The time for
such filing thus expired on May 25, r944. However, the renegotiating
departments with whom the claim for refund must have been made
have indicated that a written statement requesting the refund, filed
before the 25th of May r 944, will be considered as a timely claim.
The claim may later be perfected by filing such supporting data as is
necessary to demonstrate that the company is entitled to the refund.
The renegotiating agencies with whom the claim is filed will prescribe
the necessary regulations with regard to this matter and the agency
which handled the contractor's case originally will be the one that considers such a claim.

Exemptions by Administrative Order
The new act has vested considerable discretionary power in the War
Contracts Price Adjustment Board to exempt certain types of contracts.
Besides the three classes of contracts which the secretaries are permitted to exempt at their discretion by virtue of the r942 Act,111 ther,e have
Renegotiation Regulations 334.4; C.C.H. WAR LAw SERVICES fl 5334+
Subsection (i) (3) of the 1943 Act.
111 (I) Contracts or subcontracts to be performed outside the territorial limits of
the continental United States or Alaska, subsection (i) (4) (A);
(2) Contracts or subcontracts which because of their nature permit the determina•
109

110
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been added three additional categories permitting administrative exemptions.
(I) Contracts and subcontracts which are for so-called "standard
commercial articles," 112 niay be exempted by the board when it believes
that competitive conditions existing with relation to the sale ·of such
articles will give the Government reasonable protection against excessive prices.118 The War Contracts Price Adjustment Board has taken
the position that it will not apply this exemption with regard to individual contracts but it will be I made -applicable with respect to classes
and types of articles. When a contractor requests that this exemption
be made operative as to him the board will consider such a request upon
an industry basis rather than considering it on the basis of the individual
contractor. It is the attitude of the board that, even though certain
individual ~ontractors may not be earning excessive profits from the
sale of standard commercial items, nevertheless, they are more easily
dealt with by clearing them with regard to a renegotiation period than
by applying this exemption to contractors individually.114 Since this is
one of the discretionary exemptions, the control of its application rests
with the board.
tion of profits with reasonable certainty when the contract price is established, subsection
(i) (4) (B); and
(3) Any contract may be exempted for a specified period when its provisions are
sufficient to prevent the occurrence of excessive profits, subsection (i) (4) (C). The
citations are to the 1943 Act but these provisions are also to be found in the 1942 Act.
112
Subsection (a) (7) of the 1943 Act defines "standard commercial article" ~:
"(7) The term 'standard commercial article' means an article"(A) which is identical in every material respect with an article which was manufactured and sold, and in general civilian, industrial, or commercial use prior to
January 1, 1940,
"(B) which is identical in every material respect with an article which is manufactured and sold, as a competitive product, by more than one manufacturer, or which
is an article of the same kind and having the same use or uses as an article manufactured
and sold, as a competitive product, by more than one manufacturer, and
"(C) for which a maximum price has been established and is in effect under the
Emergency Price Control Act' of I 942, as amended, or under the Act of "October 2,
1942 entitled 'An Act to amend the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, to aid
in preventing inflation, and for other purposes,' or which is sold at a price not in
excess of the January 1, 1941, selling price.
"An. article made in whole or in part of substitute materials but otherwise identical
in every material respect with the article with which it is compared under subparagraphs
(A) and (B) shall be considered as identical in every material respect with such article
with which it is so compared." ·
118
As of June 15, 1944, no exemptions of this character had been made by the
board on the ground that compefitive conditions had not been restored.
i u Renegotiation Regulations 354.2, C.C.H. WAR LAW SERVICE 1f 5354.2.
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( 2) If the board is of the opinion that competitive conditions are
present in the making of a contract or subcontract to such an extent
that competition would be an e:ffective element in determining the ,
contract price, then the board may exempt such contracts or subcontracts.115 The attitude of the board with regard to applying this exemption is the same as in the case of exempting standard commercial
articles. Exemptions are to be granted only by classes and types-industry-wise, rather than with regard to individual contractors.116
(3) A revision in the law which may be of some help in the administration of renegotiation is the provision which permits the board
to exempt subcontracts either individually or by group when it is not
administratively possible or desirable to determine and segregate the
profits that arise from such subcontracts or group of subcontracts.117
This authority gives the administrators of the act a means of overcoming a situation where it is impossible to make a segregation of profits
if such a case should arise. The act directs the renegotiation only of
those profits arising from sales to the renegotiating agencies. Should a
case arise in which it was impossible to make a segregation of renegotiable and non-renegotiable profits without the authority to make the
exemption which this provision of the act creates, the renegotiators
might find themselves in somewhat the same position as Shylock when
he was confronted with Portia's argument that he could have his pound
m Subsection (i) (4) (E) of the 1943 Act.
116

In relation to exempting construction contracts, the War Contracts Price Adjustment Board has determined that competitive conditions which affected "the making
of construction contracts and subcontracts entered into subsequent to June 30, 1943,
were such as to result in effective competition with respect to tlie contract or subcontract price where all of the following conditions exist:
"(I) The contract or subcontract is one of the construction of buildings, structures,
improvements or other similar facilities. Contracts or subcontracts for the furnishing
of materials or supplies or for the lease or sale of machinery or equipment are not
within the scope of this exemption. Also see paragraph 346.2 for interpretation of
mandatory exemption relating to such construction and see paragraph 335.2.
"(2) The contract was entered into subsequent to June 30, 1943, and did not
constitute a substitute for or a revision or extension of an existing contract entered into
on or before June 30, 1943.
"(3) The work covered by the contract was substantially the same as the work for
which the bids were requested.
"(4) Bids were received from two or more responsible and qualified contractors,
who were independent of each other and were in actual competition with each other
for the work for which bids were requested.
"(5) The contract price was not in excess of the low bid received."
117
Subsection (i) (4) (F) of the 1943 Act.
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of flesh but no blood.116 This new exemption will permit the cutting of
this administrative Gordian knot if and when it presents itself.
DETERMINATION OF EXCESSIV-E PROFITS

The I 943 Renegotiation Act brings about many changes with respect to determining excessive profits. Statutory standards in a more
specific and extensive nature have been created, the administrators are
required to follow the Treasury's position with regard to allowances
and costs and deductions, carry-over and carry-back provisions are
specifically not allowable, a recomputation of the amortization deduction is provided for, and integrated producers are guaranteed that
material which they pr9cess from its raw state up to and beyond the
point of exemption will be accorded certain cost allowances. These
changes are among the most fundamental that have been made in the
act.
The Establishment of Statutory Standards
One of the prime criticisms leveled at renegotiation was that the
act did not establish sufficient standards or criteria which the renegotiating agencies were enjoined to follow. 119 Excessive profits are defined
under the I 942 Act as those foµnd as a result of renegotiation to represent excessive profits.120 The renegotiating agencies are called upon
to follow certain cost criteria in determining excessive profits for fiscal
years ending before July 1, 1943, principally upon the basis of that
established by chapters I and 2E of the Internal Revenue Code and
118

"Portia: Tarry a little; there is something else,
This bond doth give thee here no jot of blood,
The words expressly are 'a pound of flesh:'
Then take thy bond, take thou thy pound of flesh,
But in the cutting it, if thou dost shed
One drop of Christian blood, thy lands and goods
Are, by the Laws of Venice confiscate
Unto the state of Venice."
• SHAKESPEARE, MERCHANT OF VENICE iv, l, 319-326.
119 "The existing law has as its basic purpose the prevention of exorbitant and
unconscionable costs of materials for war. To accomplish this purpose, the act not only
gave authority to the departments charged with renegotiation to redetermine and refix
prices, but also to recapture excessive profits on amounts already paid by the Government. This last power was an innovation in our system of government. In effect, it
delegated to the departments concerned the power to determine excessive profits according to their discretion. The existing, law provided no standards for this purpose.
It defined excessive profits as 'any amount of a contract or subcontract price which is
found as a result of renegotiation to represent excessive profits.' " S. Rep. No. 627 on
H.R. 3687, 78th Cong., 1st sess., December 22, 1943 (Committee on Finance).
120
Subsection (a) (4) of the 1942 Act.
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are not permitted to allow any unreasonable salaries, bonuses or costs.
The 1943 Act, however, undertakes_ to create extensive statutory
standards by which excessive profits are to be found. In making such a
determination these factors must be considered:
"(i) Efficiency of contractor, with particular regard to attainment of quantity and quality production, reduction of costs and
economy in the use of materials, facilities, and manpower;
"(ii) reasonableness of costs and profits, with particular regard to volume of production, normal pre-war earnings, and comparison of war and peacetime products;
"(iii) amount and source of public and private capital employed and net worth;
"(iv) extent of risk assumed, including the risk incident to '
reasonable pricing policies;
"(v) nature and extent of contribution to the war effort, in~
eluding inventive and developmental contribution and cooperation
with the Government and other contractors in supplying technical
assistance;
"(vi) character of business, including complexity of manufacturing technique, character and extent of subcontracting, and rate
of turn-over· ·
' other factors the consideration of which the public
"(vii) such
interest and fair and equitable dealing may require, which factors
shall be published in the regulations of the Board from time to
time as adopted." 121
Profits that arise out of renegotiable contracts are defined as "the
excess of the amount received or accrued under such contracts and
subcontracts over the costs paid or incurred with respect thereto."122
Other standards established by the 1943 Act are to be found in those
sections describing the methods by which costs, allowances and deductions are to be ascertained as well as other sections of the act, especially
those relating to the exemption of contracts and subcontracts from the
effect of renegotiation. The 1942 Act indicates clearly the policy
against the creation and retention of excessive profits and the 1943 Act
does not change that policy. It declares, however, more definite and
certain gauges which are to be followed by the administrators of the
law in measuring excessive profits.
121

Subsection (a) (4) (A) of the 1943 Act.
Subsection (a) (4) (B) of the 1943 Act.
"The definition of 'excessive profits' in the existing law illustrates what I mean.
It is rather remarkable. It reads like this:
'The term "excessive profits" means any amount of a contract or subcontract
122
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Allowable Costs, Exclusions and Deductions
' The 1943 Act requires that the contr~ctor's regularly employed
accounting system be looked to for a reflection of his costs in the
renegotiation of fiscal years ending after June 30, 1943.123 This is a
change from the 1942 Act which is silent on this point. The policy of
the renegotiating agencies, nonetheless, was to look t9 the contractor's
books where they adequately indicated his costs. If the method of cost
accounting which the contractor uses does not properly reflect his costs
in the opinion of the board, or of the Tax Court of the United States
upon a redetermin~tion of .excessive profits, costs shall then be determined in accordance with the method determined by the board or the
Tax Court, as the case may be.124
The board and the Tax Court are both authorized and directed to
disallow any unreasonable items of cost attributable to any contract or
subcontract under consideration,125 as is true also with the secretary and
the Tax Court in the case of 1942 fiscal years.126
Another significant alteration of the act is that which requires the
price which is found as a result of the renegotiation to represent excessive profits.'
"Really a work of art by the Congress for which we are all to blame. The absence of any standard in the present law for the determination of excessive profits
leaves the American system of free enterprise completely at the mercy of the social views
. of whoever happens to have the job of determining excessive profits.
''We try on pages IOI and 102 of the hill to give a definition of 'excessive profits,'
and I think you will find a fairly satisfactory definition. Twenty-five men on the Ways
and Means Committee, who feel that they are as good as the average man and woman
of the House, have worked very assiduously, sometimes very heatedly, over this whole
subject. We went to grips with each other without nearly the unanimity that appears
on this floor now. But we tried to define 'excessive profits' in a legal manner. We
prescribe the factors on page 102 which must be taken into consideration in' the determination of excessive profits. The standards are necessarily general, for it is obvious
that a dollar amount or value cannot be ascribed to any one factor, any more than in the
purchase of a horse can so many dollars be ascribed by the purchaser to soundness, so
many to wind, and so many to a straight tail. It is impossible to fix exact standards because of varied situations and circumstances under renegotiation. All of the factors
prescribed; however, must be taken into consideration. Furthermore, when the Board
makes a determination of excessive profits it must, at the request of the contractor or
subcontractor, furnish him with a statement of the determination, of the facts used as a
basis therefor, and of the reasons for the determination of the ],'articular amount of
excessive profits found. Thus the contractor will be apprised not only of the facts
used by the Board in making its determination, but also of the reasoning which on the
basis of such facts compelled the conclusion which the Board reached." Rep. Disney,
Oklahoma, 89 CoNG. REc. No. 185, dated November' 30, 1943, p. 10249.
123
Subsection (a) (4) (B) of the 1943 Act.
124
Ibid.
125
Ibid.
126
Subsection (d) of the 194.2 Act.

1944]

RENEGOTIATION

37

allowance or disallowance of exclusions and deductions as provided in
chapters r and 2E of the Internal Revenue Code ( with the exception
of taxes measured by income) "as estimated to be allowable." Such
deductions are to be allowed, of course, only to the extent that they
are allocable to renegotiable business, but to this extent they must be
recognized as estimated to be allowable by these sections of the Internal Revenue Code.121 It is apparent that it would not be possible
effectively to administer renegotiation if the allowance of ·certain costs,
exclusions or deductions had to await not only the determination of the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue but also that of the courts. Therefore, the board is permitted to make these allowances as it "estimates"
them to be allowable under the Internal Revenue Code.
In estimating allowable costs -and deductions as provided in chapters
r and 2E of the Internal Revenue Code taxes measured by income are
to be excluded as costs. However, when excessive profits are determined an allowance for all taxes except federal taxes attributable to
that part of the contractor's renegotiable profits which are not excessive,
must be made under the provisions of the 1943 Act.128 The House
Committee on Ways & Means in its report on the Revenue Bill of:
r 943 exemplifies the operation of this part of the act by thi,s illustration:
"· .. For example, if the amount due on a contract is $r,ooo and
the cost, exclusive of State or Federal income tax, $800, the profit
would be $200. Suppose it should be determined that of the $200
profit $roo was excessive, and $roo not excessive. In determining
the amount of excessive profit to be eliminated it is provided that
proper adjustment shall be made for the State income tax excluded as an item of cost which is attributable to the ·$ roo not
excessive. If in this case the State income tax on the $ roo of fair
profit is $ ro, then this $ IO attributable to the $ roo of fair profit
would be credited against the $ roo determined to be excessive
profit reducing the amount to be eliminated to $90." 129
127

Subsection (a) (4) (B) of the 1943 Act,
Subsection (a) (4) (B) of the 1943 Act.
129
H. Rep. No. 871 on H.R. 3687, 78th Cong., 1st sess., November 18, 1943,
p. 81.
The Senate Committee on Finance in its report on the Revenue Bill of 1943,
S. Rep. No. 627 on H. R. 3687, 78th Cong., 1st sess., December 22, 1943, pp. 104105 gives this example:
"State income taxes likewise are disallowed as an item of cost but the bill provides
for a proper adjustment, in determining the amount of excessive profits to be eliminated, for such taxes attributable to the nonexcessive portion of profits. For example,
if the amount due on a contract is $1,000 and the cost is $800, the profit before
128
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The e:ffect of this section then is to make state taxes which are measured
by income allowable items of cost in the proportion to which. they are
related to the contractor's non-excessive renegotiable income. This does
not result in the Federal Government's paying state income taxes. The
procedure followed is that the amount of excessive profits is :first determined and then the· allocation of the amount of state income taxes is
made as between the excessive and non-excessive portions of the contractor's profits. Federal income and excess profits taxes are not allowable as deductions and exclusions from income for the purposes of
renegotiation.130 This adjustment for the payment of state taxes applies
only with respect to :fiscal years ending after June 30, 1943.

Aggregation of Contracts-Renegotiation by Fiscal Years
The 1942 Act permits the renegotiation of individual contracts.131
With regard to-fiscal years ending after June 30, 1943, however, individual contract renegotiation is not possible except upon request of
the contractor or subcontractor and agreement by the War Contracts
Board. And it must proceed with regard to the aggregate amounts received or accrued under renegotiable contracts or subcontracts during
a fiscal year, period or portion thereof such as may be subject to the
act.1s2
Carry-over and Carry-back
Sections 23(s) and 122 of the Internal Revenue Code permit a
carry-over of net operating losses for the :first and second preceding
taxable years as well as a carry-back of operating losses that occur in
ce,rtain subsequent years. Under the Renegotiation Act as it existed
prior to the amendments made by the Revenue Act of 1943, a loss
that was carried over was recognized where it was directly related and
adjustment for such tax is $200. Suppose that of .the $200 profit, $90 is considered
excessive before adjustment for the State tax. If in such case the State income tax on
the remaining $IIO is $II, then the $II is to be applied against the $90, reducing to
$79 the amount of excessive profit to be eliminated."·
130 The discussion here is related to the application of this adjustment as provided in subsection (a) (4) (B) of the 1943 Act where the state tax is imposed on i flat
rate basis. Adjustment for graduated state taxes differs somewhat and follows the procedure set forth in Renegotiation Regulations 389.3; C.C.H. WAR LAw SERVICE 1f
5389-3131 Subsection (c) (1) of the 1942 Act.
132 Subsection (c) (1) of the 1943 Act.
Inasmuch as renegotiation may be extended beyond December 31, 1944 for any
period not to exceed six months, it is possible that there may be renegotiation of portions of fiscal years. This possibility has been adverted to through subsection (c) (6)
of the 1943 Act.
·
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attributable to the contracts which were the subject of the renegotiation.
Carry-backs were not recognized, however, because it would be necessary to reopen a renegotiation settlement in order to give them effect.
Now, relating back to April 28, r942 the allowance of any carry-over
and carry-back as an item of cost is specifically prohibited.188

Amortization Deductions
The amortization deductions authorized by section I 24 of the Internal Revenue Code with regard to war facilities permitting the cost
of such facilities to be amortized over a sixty-month period for purposes
of taxation are proper deductions from income in renegotiation to the
extent that they are allocable to renegotiable sales. Section I 24( d )- of
the Internal Revenue Code permits an acceleration of the amortization
period where the war emergency is declared at an end prior to the
expiration of the sixty-month period or upon the issuance of certificates
of non-necessity.18 ¼ The acceleration of the period, however, raises the
problem as to what effect the recomputation of the amortization resulting from such acceleration will. be given in renegotiation.
If the renegotiation has not been completed for a fiscal year affected
by the recomputation of the amortization deduction the recomputed
amortization- will be given effect as an allowable cost to the extent
attributable to renegotiable business in the renegotiation of that year.185
Where the renegotiation has been completed, however, how is the
recomputation of the amortization to be recognized? As has been
pointed out, it was not considered possible to reopen agreements for
I 942 fiscal years so as to recognize this recomputation. Subsection
(a)(4)(D) of the r943 Act, however, by provisions retroactive to
April 28, r942 establishes a means for providing a refund of excessive
profits eliminated through the renegotiation of a prior year insofar as
the recomputation under section r24( d) is in excess of the deductions
that have been allowed in such renegotiation. Where there is an acceleration of the amortization period and the recomputation flowing
188
Subsection (a) (4) (C) of the 1943 Act. Section 710 (c) of the Internal
Revenue Code provides for a carry-over and carry-back of unused excess profits tax
credit, but a recognition of this is also forbidden.
lS¼ The regulations for the issuance of certificates of non-necessity 1,s provided by
section I 24 of the Internal Revenue Code have not yet been promulgated. Therefore,
none of these certificates have been issued. It is anticipated, however, that the regulations governing the issuance of these certificates which will permit an acceleration of
the sixty-month amortization period, under circumstances where the facilities are no
longer needed in the war effort, will soon be forthcoming.
185
Subsection (a) (4) (b) of the 1943 Act.
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therefrom is made after the renegotiation of a given year, the contractor receives no allowance in renegotiation for the additional amortization accruing to his benefit for federal income and excess profits tax
purposes. And the fact that at the time renegotiation is being conducted
the recomputation of the amortization deduction may not have been
made, is not considered as a ground for postponing the determination
of excessive profits and will not stay the payment of any amount found
to be excessive.186 But after the recomputation of the amortization
deduction by the Bureau of Internal Revenue has been completed a
refund becomes available to the contractor from the department that
has made the renegotiation. This will be determined by computing the
"gross renegotiation rebate" 137 which is that.portion of the additional
amortization deduction permitted through the recomputation under
section r24(d) allocable to renegotiable sales for each prior renegotiated year. _The amount of the gross renegotiation rebate, however,
cannot be recognized in an amount greater than the excessive profits
eliminated for each such year less the amount of the contractor's federal
income and excess profits tax benefit from renegotiation for the renegotiated year. The tax benefit will be the amount by which the contractor's taxes for the renegotiated year were decreased either through
the omission from gross income of that part of the excessive. profits
which is not in excess of, but may be equal to, the sum of the additional
amortization deduction or by the application of, section 3 806 of the
Intei:nal Revenue Code with reference to this amount.18·8 The amount
yielded by this computation is the sum which will be refunded. It is
the "net renegotiation rebate" for the renegotiated year and will be
repaid to the contractor by the United States, but without interest.189
Here is an example showing the calculation of the net renegotiation
rebate:
Assume that a contractor had been issued certificates of necessity
to cover' emergency facilities costing $ r ,000,000. Of these facilities
$750,000 have been used exclusively in the performance of renegotiable business during the fiscal year under consideration and the
remainder, $250,006, has been used in the performance of non-renegotiable contracts. · During the fiscal year considered the contractor
refunded _$600,000 as excessive profits. For that yea,r the contractor
took a $200,000 amortization deduction in his tax return. Following
186

Subsection (a) (4) (C) of the 1943 Act.
Subsection (a) (4) (D) of the 1943 Act.
1 ~8 Ibid. Under chapters 1, zA, 2B, zD, and 2E of the Internal Revenue Code.
189
Subsection (a) (4) (D) of the 1943 Act.
187
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the close of the renegotiation for this period the amortization period
was terminated and a recomputation was made for federal income and
excess profits tax purposes which raised the amount allowable for
federal taxes to $500,000 in this one year. Under these assumed circumstances subsection (a) (4) (D) would operate in this way:
Of the $200,000 which the contractor took as an amortization
deduction on his tax return, seventy-five per cent is attributable to
renegotiable business and this amount, $ I 50,000, was allowed in renegotiation. The recomputed deduction as provided in section I 24( d)
for this year is $500,000 and since seventy-five µer cent of these
facilities were used in renegotiable business, of this additional amortization deduction, $3 75,ooo is allocable to renegotiable busines{l, $ I 50,000
amortization deduction was allowed in the original renegotiation. The
excess over the amortization deduction originally allowed for renegotiation is $225,000. Inasmuch as the contractor cannot be allowed
as a refund here an amount greater than the amount of the additional
amortization deductions which were allowed for renegotiation in the
year under consideration less the tax savings which the contractor
realized through the omission from gross income of excessive profits
equaling the amount of the additional amortization deductions, it is
necessary to compute the tax on the amount of the excess over the
amortization deduction originally allowed. Assuming that the contractor in this illustration is in the eighty per cent bracket for federal
income and excess profits tax purposes, the tax on this excess· amount
would be $ I 80,000. Therefore, the net rebate as the result of the recomputation to be repaid to the contractor is $45,000.
The act directs that the board shall issue regulations for determining the allocation of the additional amortization deduction to the
renegotiated year.140 These have not yet been issued, however, inasmuch as the two conditions, the happening of either of which would
permit the acceleration of the amortization period and a recomputation
of the amortization, have not transpired. The emergency as defined
in section 124 has not ended and the regulations for the issuance of
certificates of non-necessity have not been promulgated.
Allowable Costs in the Case of Certain Producers
Under the administration of renegotiation prior to the Revenue Act
of I 943 it was the policy of the renegotiating departments to accord
contractors and subcontractors who processed the mineral and natural
140

Ibid.
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deposits and raw materials that were covered by the act,141 a cost allowance which was generally equivalent to an amount which the contractor would have realized had he S<?ld the product in the form which
it had in the last stage of processing before becoming non-exempt. The
object of this costing method was to accord the same treatment to
integrated and non-integrated producers. This procedure worked so
satisfactorily 142 that Congress made it a part of the Renegotiation Act
retroactive to April 28, 1942 and extended this cost allowance to a
contractor or subcontractor "who produces or acquires an agricultural
product and processes, refines, or treats such a product to and beyond
the first form or state in which it is customarily sold or in which it
has an established market." 143 This retroactive feature, in the light of
the prior practice of the renegotiating departments, will have no new
effect except that this cost allowance also applies in the case of agricultural commodities; but this procedure is now a part of the statute
rather than being operative only through administrative regulation.
Conversion to War Production
Since many contractors have made extensive plant rearrangement
in converting their facilities to war production, the problem of the ex141 Subsection ( i) (I) (ii) of the 1942 Act prior to the enactment of § 70 I of
the Revenue Act of 1943.
142 S. Rep. No. 627 on H.R. 3687, 78th Cong., 1st sess., Dec.ember 22, 1943,
pp. 35-36 (Committee on Finance):
"It has been brought to the attention of the committee that the interpretation of
the exemption of products of a mine, oil or gas well, or other mineral or natural deposits, or timber, which have not been processed, refined, or treated beyond the first
form or state suitable for industrial use, as made by the departments whose contracts
were originally made subject to }enegotiation, has been questioned both by representatives of industry and by representatives of other departments of the Government. There
has been suggested on the one hand that the state at which the exemption should have
been applied was at a point closer to the depletion line and, on the other hand, certain
representatives of industry have taken the position that the exempt status of certain
other products has been set at a state prior to the first form or state at which the same
were suitable for industrial use. After consideration of the published regulations and
exemptions of the departments in connection with this provision of the law, it was
concluded that the application thereof which had been adopted by the departments was
appropriate and within the limits of the discretion vested in' the departments by the
Congress to define, interpret, and apply this provision of the statute. Consequently, this
section has been reenacted in its original form and, at the suggestion of the departments, there has been added a prQvision expressly authorizing the making of appropriate
cost allowances in the case of an integrated producer who processes an exempted product
up to and beyond the first form or state suitable for industrial use in order to place such
producer in a position comparable with that of other producers who sell such products
at the exempt stage."
·
143
Subsection (i) (3) of the 1943 Act.
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tent to which the costs of such conversion will be allowed in renegotiation is of considerable interest. The answer to this question lies in
the fact that the agencies must follow the rulings of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue with regard to this matter, at least "as estimated" to
be allowable.144 The attitude of the bureau presently is that, where
such conversion and rearrangement does not represent a permanent
addition to the contractor's plant, such costs are allowable for the
purposes of federal income and excess profits taxes. Since this is the
case they will also be allowed in renegotiation insofar as allocable to
renegotiable sales. One of the best examples where costs are most
likely to be allowed as not constituting permanent additions, is in the
case of the rearrangement of machinery and equipment; and certain
partitions placed in a company's plant which are clearly and purely
of a temporary nature may also be allowed where related to renegotiable business. 145
RECAPTURE OF EXCESSIVE PROFITS

Under the 1943 Act where the board or the Tax Court makes a
determination of excessive profits, the board is directed to instruct the
secretary of the department to bring about the elimination of any
amount to be recovered. 148 The methods under the 1943 Act do not
differ substantially from those previously permitted.141 A provision of
importance in the 1943 Act, however, is one which provides that "each
contractor and subcontractor is hereby indemnified by the United States
against all claims by any subcontractor on account of amounts withheld
from such subcontractor pursuant to this paragraph." 148 This clause
was designed to implement the recovery of amounts due under subcontracts between the contractor or a subcontractor and another contractor. Where, in relation to fiscal years ending after June 30, 1943,
a contractor or subcontractor is directed to withhold amounts which he
owes to another subcontractor, the contractor who withholds amounts
otherwise due and owing to the subcontractor will now be indemnified
against any action which the subcontractor might bring against him for
such sums withheld.
There are certain methods of p~yment available which contractors
may find useful. In paying excessive profits, aside from payment in
144

Subsection (a) (4) (B) of the 1943 Act.
Renegotiation Regulations 384; C.C.H. WAR
148 Subsection (c) (2) of the 1943 Act.
m Cf. subsection (c) (2) of the 1943 Act.
148
Subsection (c) (2) of the 1943 Act.
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cash, the contractor may issue a credit memorandum to one of the
renegotiating departments to be applicable against specified existing
prime contracts where the sum of the amounts remaining u~paid
thereon is not in excess of the amount to be credited.140 Tax anticipation notes are not an acceptable means of payment. The Treasury Department, nevertheless, has authorized the redemption currently of
Series B or Series C tax notes in those instances where the amounts
received from the redemption of the notes are to be used in the
liquidation of the renegotiation obligation.15O
THE TAX EFFECT OF RENEGOTIATION

The Revenue Act of r943 amends section 3806 of the Internal
Revenue Code so as to extend the tax credit ·in renegotiation, which
· this section provides, to individuals under the circumstances created by
the income tax computation features of the Current Tax Payment Act
of r943.151 It will be remembered that, because of the forgiveness
features of that act, there was no· tax credit available for individuals
with regard to the renegotiation and elimination of excessive profits
for the 1942 taxable year.152 As between the taxable years r942 and
I 943 there is only one tax liability since the tax is determined by a
comparison of the incomes, I 942 and I 943, and the tax is then paid
upon the larger of the two. Because of these facts the only tax credit
available to an individual as a result of elimination of excessive profits
through renegotiation for the taxable years r942 and r943 is with
respect to the taxable year r943. The tax credit which becomes available by virtue of the revisions in section 3 806 which are made retroactive to the date of the original enactment of this section, October 2r,
r942, is the amount by which'the total-tax for r943 is decreased as a
result of the elimination of excessive profits received or accrued to the
taxpayer in r942 or _r943. Thus, because the Current Tax Payment
Act of I 943 makes provisions for a computation of the tax tlirough a ·
comparison of the income for the taxable year I 942' and the income
for the taxable year I 943 with a forgiveness of seventy-five per cent
Renegotiation Regulations'422.5; C.C.H. WAR LAW SERVICE 1f 5422.5.
Renegotiation Regulations 422.6; C.C.H. WAR LAW SERVICE 1f 5422.6.
151
Section 701 (c) of the Revenue Act of 1943.
For a discussion of the tax effect in renegotiation in relation to corporations and
to individuals before the further extension of tax credit provided by the amendment to
§ 3806 by § 701 (c) of the Revenue Act of 1943, see Steadman, "Legal Aspects of
Renegotiation," 42 M1cH. L. REv. 545 at 586 (1944).
152
Under the Current Tax Payment Act of 1943 any taxable year which began
in 1:942 is the 1942 taxable year for an' individual.
.
149
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of the lesser of the two, the larger of either an individual's tax liability
for the year r 943 as reflected on the I 943 return or the total of his
payments for his r 942 and 1943 taxes will be the amount of an individual's total tax liability for the taxable year 1943 which will be
diminished through the elimination of excessive profits in renegotiation.
In. those cases then, where the renegotiation of an individual is
completed after the filing of the tax return for the taxable year 1943,
the credit to be granted by virtue of section 3 806 (b) will be an amount
equal to the decrease in the tax for the taxable year 1943 resulting
from the elimination of 1942's excessive profits from 1942 income.158
In many cases renegotiation of an individual for the year 1942 was
completed before he had filed his r 943 tax return. In some of these
instances taxpayers estimated that they had already paid, with regard
to their 1942 tax, more than the tax for the taxable year I 943 was
likely to be. A contract clause for inclusion in renegotiation agreements
was authorized to cover these situations and under this clause the individual was given a credit in· the amount of the estimated overpayment
of his 1943 tax. An adjustment of the credit was then to be made when
the 1943 tax return was filed so that the credit ultimately allowed
would equal the amount actually allowable. The amendments to section 3 806 contained in the Revenue Act of 1943 provided a statutory
recognition of the credits permitted under these contracts.m The principles that are enunciated here are applicable to partnerships as well as
individuals. Partnerships, however, file only information returns and
federal income tax is imposed with regard to the individual incomes of
the partners. Thus they receive separate credits, the partnership itself
being entitled to the aggregate of these credits provided for individuals
under section 3806.
The relation of renegotiation and state taxation came to the attention of Congress while the Revenue Act 6f 1943 was being considered.m There is little or no uniformity of treatment accorded renegotiation refunds by the various states in the matter of allowing credits
for purposes of state income taxation. Where a contractor's profits are
reduced through a renegotiation which follows the payment of state
income taxes, some states allow refunds, some do not and still others
158

For a valuable discussion on the relationship of renegotiation and taxation see
Watts, "Recognition and Federal Taxation," IO LAW and CoNTEMP. PRoB. 341
(1943).
lH Section 701 (c) of the Revenue Act of 1943.
155
S. Rep. No. 627 on H.R. 3687, 78th Cong., 1st sess., December 22, 1943, p.
104 (Committee on Finance).
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give a limited effect to this reduction of income. As renegotiation is
conductei with relation to fiscal years ending before July 1, 1943, a
contractor is permitted a credit or deduction for whatever tax he was
required to pay under the state tax law which he could not recover.
Since the states do not accord a, uniform treatment to renegotiation
and certainly there is no uniformity with regard to state taxes measured
by income, the result is that the states' are not treated alike through
this renegotiation procedure. In those cases where renegotiation is conducted with a contractor who is,subject to the tax laws of a state which
does not allow refunds for excessive profits eliminated in renegotiation,
the Federal Government has assumed the burden, whereas those states
that do allow a refund have had to carry the load and have suffered
diminished incomes. When the amendments to renegotiation by the
Revenue Act of 1943 were being considered, the National Association
of Tax Administrators sought to have included a provision that every
contractor would be allowed on renegotiation a credit for state income
taxes as computed in accordance with the applicable state laws without
adjustment f~r any excessive profits paid to the Federal Government
after the end of the period which forms the basis for determining the
contractor's state taxes. The simple result of this is that the. state would
be permitted to ignore renegotiation after the end of any given taxable
year.
Although the primary consideration with relation to this problem
is the state income tax, franchise taxes, as well as capital stocks and
gross receipts taxes,_ are also concerned. For the law to have been
amended so as to permit the contractor's state income taxes to be
wholly recognized as an item of cost in renegotiation would cause an
assumption of state income taxes by the Federal Government in the
instance of every company that was renegotiated. Therefore, in amending the Renegotiation Act, Congress directed that state income taxes
be disallowed as an item of cost.156 However, as already pointed out
in a prior discussion of this matter, in determining the existence of
excessive profits, an adjustment is to be made for the amount of such
"taxes measured by income" as are attributable to the non-excessive
part of the contractor's profits. The effect of this is to charge as a cost
the state taxes on the non-excessive portion of the contractor's profits
arising from renegotiable business against the profits that have been
determined to be excessive.157 The Federal Government then will
156
157

Subsection (a) (4) (B) of the 1943 Act.
Subsection (a) (4) (B) of the 1943 Act.
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uniformly bear the state income tax because of this credit arrangement
with regard to the non-excessive portion of the contractor's renegotiable
profits f~r all fiscal years ending after June 30, 1943, irrespective of
whether the state permits a credit for profits recaptured in renegotiation
or not. This is calculated to make uniform the treatment of state
income tax laws in renegotiation and to encourage the states not to tax
excessive profits. In dealing with the effect which state income taxes
are to be accorded in renegotiation it is important to take into account
the recent ruling of the War Contracts Price Adjustment Board which
significantly interprets the phrase "taxes measured by income" found
in subsection (a)(4)(B) of the 1943 Act to mean net income taxes and
not gross receipts or gross income taxes as applied to state and local
taxation.
REPRICING OF WAR CONTRACTS

Closely related to renegotiation is the repricing of war contracts.
The Revenue Act of 1943 separated from renegotiation that feature of
the 1942 Act which permits the refixing of prices.m This power was
taken out of the Renegotiation Act and conferred upon the procurement agencies through section 801 of the Revenue Act of 1943.159
m Subsection (a) (3) of the 1942 Act.
159

Pub. L. 235, 78th Cong., 2d sess., enacted February 25, 1944.
The reasons for this repricing section and the shifting of the l?ower to fix contract prices from renegotiation to the Repricing of War Contracts Act is set forth in the
Committee Report, Revenue Bill 1943 in S. Rep. No. 627 on H.R. 3687, 78th Cong.,
1st sess., December 22, 1943, pp. 37-38 (Committee on Finance):
"A new title is inserted as to repricing. Recapture of past profits does not wholly
solve the problem of adequate profit control. It is even more important to prevent the
recurrence of excessi~e profits by adjusting prices to a fair and reasonable basis for the
future.
"Such reductions of prices for future deliveries are vital in the interest of efficiency
and inflation control as well as profit control. Taxes, flat profit limitations or other
methods of profit recapture, reach only what is left after all payments, costs, and expenses of the producer have been met. For this reason they may tend to foster wasteful
or unnecessary expenditures and even at best can do little to encourage reductions in
costs. But in the war program control of costs is as important as the control of profits.
With shortages of materials and labor, all producers must be encouraged to operate at
their highest efficiency in order to obtain maximum production of war materials from
available resources. The reduction of prices to a sound basis is one of the b~st methods to
induce contractors to maintain efficiency. This pressure on prices of war materials tends
to prevent waste of labor or materials, and unnecessary expenditures which contribute
to inflation.
"The present renegotiation statute directs the departments to renegotiate contract
and subcontract prices to eliminate excessive profits likely to be realized, and empowers
the department to reduce such prices under the statute. The House bill confers similar
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Congress had apparently come to the decision that in contracting for
war commodities the procuring agencies of the Government should
place e~phasis upon a greater conciseness in pricing. It was believed,
moreover, that, while the procurement departments had lacked the
information permitting them to conduct close pricing in the early stages
9f the war, this is no longer true and adequate information is or ought
to be available upon which fair contract prices can be established at the
time the contract is made.160 It was therefore determined to confer
upon the departments conducting war procurement the authority to
reprice contracts whenever the head of such department considers the
price being charged by a contractor or subcontractor to be unreasonable.
authority on the departments. Under it the Secretary is authorized to refix prices by
agreement or order subject to appeal to the courts.
'
"In the interest of clarity your committee proposes that the repricing authority be
separated entirely from the renegotiation statute. The methods and considerations appropriate to the reprici,ng power are different from those applicable to renegotiation on
an over-all basis for the purpose of recapture. Actually, the authority to reprice is more
analogous to the power to place compulsory orders contained in Section 9 of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940.
"Accordingly, your committee has amended the House bill and the existing law to
place the authority of the departments to adjust prices in a separate title, section 801, of
your committee ,bill. Under it the Secretary of a department is given full power to
adjust prices for articles and services supplied by contractors with his department or
subcontractors thereunder. If this cannot be done by agreement the Secretary may do
so by order., The contractor is protected, however, by an express right to sue the
United States to obtain fair and just compensation for the articles or services supplied.
The department will pay to the contractor the full amount of the price fixed by an
order and, if the contractor thinks the price thus fixed unfair, he may bring suit against
the Government to recover the difference in the amount paid and the amount which he
believes should have been paid. Any new price fixed under this section applies only to
deliveries after the date of the order. Thus, these price adjustments are prospective only
and do not involve recapture. Consequently this authority will not overlap the over-all
renegotiation for the purpose of recapture of past profits." War Department Procurement Regulations, § 1270 et seq., delineate the Army's procedure with regard to the
utilization of this section 801 of the Revenue Act of 1943.
160
S. Rep. No. 627 on H.R. 3687, 78th Cong., 1st sess., December 22, 1943,
p. 32 (Committee on Finance):
'-'•.. Furthermore, it [renegotiation] was a recognition that the departments were
unable in contracts for procurement of these materials to fix fair and reasonable prices.
To a great extent this was difficult when we first entered the war, particularly with
respect to new designs and demands for increased volume after contracts had been
made. However, the statute included all materials and did not make provision that,
when sufficient procurement experience had been gained, the responsibility for unreasonable costs should be put where it properly belongs, that is, in the procurement
function of the departments. It is only through careful and proper procurement that
it is possible to prevent payment of excessive prices, for costs once paid are difficult of
recovery through a consideration of the profits of the particular individual, which bear
little relation to what should have been the fair price of an item."
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Congress was also of the opinion that the repricing of contracts and
recapture of excessive profits were not essentially of the same character
and ought to be handled differently. Hence the Repricing of War
Contracts Act.161 Under this act, when the secretary or department
head decides that a contract price is unfair or unreasonable, he may
require the person furnishing the article or service to reduce the prices
and furnish such things at prices which the "department head considers
to be reasonable.162 Thereafter, if the contractor is not satisfied with
the price which has been specified by the secretary, he may bring
action in the Court of Claims for the difference between the amount
fixed for payment and what he believes to be a fair price.168 However,
if the contractor sues in the Court of Claims and it is there decided that
the amount awarded by the secretary is more than a fair price, the
contractor then must pay to the United States the difference between
the price determined by the court and the price set by the secretary.
The contractor's taking his action to the Court of Claims does not
operate to stay the secretary's order.16' Any action which the contractor
decides to file with the Court of Claims must be within six months
after the secretary's order refixing the price or within six months after
the period during which the stated price is to remain in effect, whichever is the later date. If the contractor should refuse to perform the
order at the price stipulated by the secretary then the Government can
take over his plant under section 9 of the Selective Training and Service
Act of 1940 as amended and have the work performed.165
Every purchase order, agreement or contract which is for the making or furnishing of any article or service of any kind to
of the
renegotiating agencies of the Government m made thirty days or more
after the effective date of the act 167 is deemed to contain a provision
by which the persons furnishing such services or articles agree to these
repricing provisions.168 Section 801 of the Revenue Act of 1943 has no
application to any contract or subcontract made after the termination of
hostilities, a date to be established through a proclamation of the Presi-

an

any

161

Note 159 supra.
Subsection 801 (b) of the Revenue Act of 1943, Pub. L. 235, 78th Cong., 2d
sess., enacted February 25, 1944.
168
Subsection (c) of§ 801 of the Revenue Act of 1943, Pub. L. 235, 78th Cong.,
2d sess., enacted February 25, 1944.
1
°' Ibid.
165
Subsection (d) of§ 801 of the Revenue Act of 1943.
166
As stated in subsection (a) (I) of the 1943 Act.
167
February 25, 1944.
165
Subsection (f) of § 801 fo the Revenue Act of 1943.
162

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 43

dent or a concurrent resolution of both Houses of Congress, whichever
is the· earlier.169 The Repricing Act itself becomes effective from the
date of its enactment, February 25, 1944.110
Section 801 does not clearly indicate whether the secretary's order
fixing the price may be made applicable to units of contracts already
delivered. The act compels the furnishing of goods or services at the
price fixed by the secretary "after the effective date of the order." 171
This phrase is unfortunate in that it is open to the interpretation that
the secretary may ·establish "the effective date of the order" as one
prior to the making of the order. Reports of both the Senate Committee on Finance and the House Committee on Ways & Means serve
to clarify this point.
Regarding the Repricing Act, the report of the House Ways &
Means Committee says:

"· •. If no agreement is reached, the Secretary may by order
fix the price which he determines to be fair for the performance
under the contract ,or subcontract after the date of the order •••" 112
The Senate Committee on Finance said this:
". . • Any new price fixed under this section applies only to
deliveries after the date of the order. Thus, these price adjustments are prospective only and do not involve recapture. Consequently this authority will not overlap over-all renegotiation for
the purpose of recapture of past profits." 173
These statements make it abundantly apparent that the repricing of
war contracts section does not confer upon the departments the authority to make price fixing orders other than prospectively. In separating
renegotiation and repricing it was believed that the repricing powers
are substantially different from those regulatory powers established
through renegotiation OJl an overall basis for the purpose of recapturing
excessive profits. Congress believed that the authority to reprice was
more analogous to the power to place compulsory orders as contained
in section 9 of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940m than
109
Subsection 802 (b) of the Revenue Act of 1943. Noteworthy is the difference
between the cutoff dates in the Renegotiation and the Repricing Acts.
170
Subsection 802 (a) of the Revenue Act of 1943.
171
Subsection 801 (b) of the Revenue Act of 1943.
172
H. Rep. No. 871 on· H.R. 3687, 78th Cong., 1st sess., November 18, 1943,
p. 84 (Committee on Ways and Means). (Italics supplied).
173
S. Rep. No. 627 on H.R. 3687, 78th Cong., 1st sess., December 22, 1943,
p. 38 (Committee on Finance).
1
n Act of September 16, 1940, 54 Stat. L. 885.
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it is to renegotiation.m There is certainly much logic to this position
but this statutory rearrangement is certainly not revolutionary. And
the power to place compulsory orders existed prior to renegotiation
and repricing under the Selective Training and Service Act. The
repricing authority has merely been taken from the Renegotiation Act
and placed in a separate statute. Repricing is more in the nature of a
condemnation award than in the nature of recapture. Its basis is one
of fair and just compensation rather than in determination of what an
unfair profit may be. Actually the repricing section introduces no new
theory to American law and is in line with previous wartime enactments.176
The Repricing of War Contracts Act should prove a very effective
instrument in procurement. If properly employed it can go far to make
renegotiation and recapture of excessive profits unnecessary by removing the opportunity for the making of such profits through close contract pricing.111
RENEGOTIATION AND ADJUSTMENT OF PATENT ROYALTIES

The Royalty Adjustment Act, Public Law 768, provides a means
for reducing prospectively the amounts to be paid in royalties for the
use of inventions: This statute directs the secretary or head of a department who has ordered the manufacture, use, sale or other disposition of inventions for the United States which involve the payment of
royalties, to reduce the amount of any royalties being paid which he
believes are unreasonable or excessive. In order to bring about a
royalty adjustment the secretary of the department concerned is to
proceed in this way. He is first to give a notice to the licensor and
licensee that- he believes the royalties are unreasonable. Following that
notice the act empowers him to fix the royalties at amounts which he
determines are fair and just. The licensee or licensor has a right to a
175 See note 159 ,upra.
176 Act of July 2, 1917, 40 Stat. L. 241; Act of April
177 Bus1NESS WEEK, No. 773, p. 7 (June 24, 1944).

11,

1918, 40 Stat. L. 518.

"Several top procurement officials predict that the War Dept. will not ask President Roosevelt to use his authority to extend renegotiation of contracts beyond the Jan.
1, 1945, cutoff date.
"The Army is fairly well satisfied with the results of the close-pricing policy it
adopted when the renegotiation law was overhauled early this year (BW-Jan. 29 '44.
p. 5). It also relies on its repricing powers which were separated from renegotiation at
that time. Repricing of undelivered goods---as distinct from renegotiation of prices on
completed work-is not subject to the cutoff date.
"Some contractors, after seeing how the new policy works, have decided that they
liked the old system better."
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hearing but after the effective date of the notice the licensee is not
permitted to pay the licensor any sum in excess of the established
amount. 178 A licensor dissatisfied with the amount of royalties established by the department head is permitted access to the Court of
Claims for the recovery of any sums such as will constitute fair and
just compensation for the manufacture, use or sale of the licensed invention "taking into account the conditions of wartime production." 119
This act is purely a wartime measure,180 which is to continue in force
for the period of the war and six months thereafter.181 Its purpose is to
reduce the amount of royalties in cases where they are unreasonable
under the circumstances of wartime procurement. The essence of the
situation with which the Royalty Adjustment Act seeks to cope is
found in this statement:
"Many license. contracts provide for a percentage royalty
which was predicated upon commercial or peacetime Army production. Their makers never visualized the situation which now exists.
A 5- or even a IO-percent royalty on a small commercial volume,
would, perhaps, have been fair and equitable, but the same percentage of royalty applied upon a hundred or a thousand times
greater volume due to the war becomes excessive." 182
Certainly then, the object of the act is to bring about a readjustment of royalties where wartime production has so accelerated the
return to the licensor that the amounts which he receives are disproportionate to the returns reasonably to have been anticipated under peacetime conditions.
The issue has arisen as to the exact natl.ire of the relationship between royalty adjustrp.ent and renegotiation. Does the Royalty Adjustment Act exclude patent royalties from the :field of renegotiation
and is the Renegotiation Act so drawn as to apply to amounts received
by way of royalties? The objectives of renegotiation and royalty adjustment are immediately recognized as being very similar. They are
both founded upon a policy of preventing the realization of unreasonRoyalty Adjustment Act of 1942, § 1, Pub. L. 768, 77th. Cong., 2d sess.,
approved October 31, 1942, 56 Stat. L. 1013. Hereinafter referred to as Royalty Adjustment Act of 1942. ·
·
179
Section 2, Royalty Adjustment Act of 1942.
180 The preamble to the Royalty Adjustment Act of 1942 states: "That, to aid in
the successful prosecution of the War.•••"
181 Section 7 of the Royalty Adjustment Act of 1942.
182
Statement of Col. Earl S. Patterson in H. Hearings on H.R. 7620, 77th Cong.,
2d sess., October 13, 14 and 15, 1942 at p. 21 (Committee on Patents).
178
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able profits which arise out of war conditions. If renegotiation is also
applicable to patent royalties, then it would appear that these two
statutes overlap to a certain degree. Renegotiation, however, applies
retroactively and the Royalty Adjustment Act applies only prbspectively--in futuro. It has been argued that Congress did not intend
renegotiation to apply to the receipt of royalties since an overlapping
of statutory authority dealing with the same matter would result. But
the Royalty Adjustment Act was enacted after the Renegotiation Act
and it appears rather definitely that the framers of the Royalty Adjustment Act did not intend to withdraw patent royalties from the
area of renegotiation 183 for that act provides:
"Nothing herein contained shall be deemed to preclude the
applicability of Section 403 of Public Law 528, Seventy-seventh
Congress, as the same may be heretofore or hereafter amended so
far as· the same may be applicable." 184
The definition of "subcontract" found in .the Renegotiation Act as
it was originally enacted probably did not cover the renegotiation of
royalties. 185 And it is apparent from the hearings held when the
Royalty Adjustment Act was pending before Congress ·that those who
testified before the House Committee on Patents did not feel that the
Renegotiation Law as it then stood, covered a!llounts received by way
of royalties.186
Id. at P· 39:
"It is a short section, and I will read it at this time:
'Nothing herein contained shall be deemed to preclude the applicability of section
403 of Public Law 5 28, Seventy-seventh Congress, as the same may be heretofore or
thereafter amended so far as the same may be found applicable.'
"Now, section 403 of Public Law 528 deals with renegotiation of contracts, and
as the committee knows, there is now pending, I believe, a bill which has already been
passed by the Senate which amends section 403 with regard to the renegotiation of
contracts, and it is thought that because of the fact that it is not known whether this
bill would be acted upon by the Congress prior to the enactment of that amendment
that there should be no question as to this law being subject to and not acting as a
repeal in any way of any of the provisions of the renegotiation statute.''
184
Section 9, Royalty Adjustment Act of 1942.
185
Section 403 (a), Sixth Supplemental National Defense Appropriation Act,
Pub. L. 528, 77th Cong., 2d sess., approved April 28, 1942, 56 Stat. L. 226 at 245:
"For the purposes of subsections (d) and (e) of this section, the term 'contract'
includes a subcontract and the term 'contractor' includes a subcontractor.''
186
Statement of Col. Earl S. Patterson in H. Hearings on H.R. 7620, 77th Cong.,
2d sess., October 13, 14 and 15, 1942 at p. 21 (Committee on Patents):
"In our opinion, existing royalties can, in all fairness to the inventor or the .patent
holder, be reduced to effect a really huge saving in the War Department procurement.
"This bill [The Royalty Adjustment Act] is, in the opinion of the War Dep:u-ti8s
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At the time the hearings on the Royalty Adjustment Act were
being conducted there was also pending in Congress an amendment to
the Renegotiation Act. It is apparent from the testimony before the
House Committee considering the Royalty Adjustment Act that it was
the intention of the framers of that act to neither limit nor restrict the
scope of renegotiation and that it was to stand wholly apart from renegotiation and to be conducted separately irrespective of the scope of
renegotiation.187 It is believed, therefore, that the existence of the
Royalty Adjustment Act does not in and of itself preclude the application of the Renegotiation Act to royalties. Whether the Renegotiation
Act covers amounts received as royalties remains for inquiry.
On October 21, 1942 the Renegotiation Act was amended.188
Among the alterations made in the act was the fhange in the definition
of "subcontract." There appears for the first time in that act this language, and although the Renegotiation Act has been amended several
ment, the best method of meet{ng the Army's present needs. It covers cases which cannot be reached by requisitioning or other remedies."
Letter from James Forrestal then Acting Secretary of the Navy, p. 32:
"The Navy Department has found that in many instances, manufacturers with
whom contracts for the production of material for the Navy Department have been
placed are operating under licensing agreements, entered into prior to our entry into the
war, binding such manufacturers to pay specific royalties. These royalties under peacetime conditions and for the quantities then being produced may be considered fair and
reasonable, but when applied to the enormous quantities needed for the prosecution of
the war, these royalty rates are regarded in some cases as exorbitant, excessive and unfair.
"This situation, in a number of instances has been somewhat relieved by negotiations between representatives of ~e Navy Department and the owners of the patents.
This method, however, has not been entirely successful because patent owners are legally
entitled to require observance of existing contractual obligations.
"The proposed legillation will proflide a muck needed remedy for the conditions."
(Italics supplied). Statement ·of Mr. Ralph L. Chappell, p. ·41:
"Well, I believe that this legislation will touch primarily royalties which have not
yet been paid. However, it is not at all unreasonable to think that in determining
what is a reasonable royalty the test might be considered. I do not think there is any
specific authorization in the bill and no intention of going back of a situation where
the royalty has actually been paid."
Statement of Mr. Lanham, p. 42:
"In other words, under the renegotiation statute there would ~ no opportunity
to recoup for the Government unreasonable fees that have been paid."
187 See Statement of Col. Earl S. Patterson, id. at p. 39. At' page 40 he said:
"I intend to convey the thought to the committee that whatever contract was
made in settlement of a controversy existing under this bill, if it in turn came within
the provisions of the renegotiation statute, as amended, then, of course, it would be
subject to renegotiation. It is not our intent to enlarge or limit the renegotiation law."
188
Section 801 of the Revenue Act of 1942, Pub. L. 753, 77th Cong., 2d sess.,
approved October 21, 1942, 56 Stat. L. 798 at 982.
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times and the definition of "subcontract" has been• considerably expandeq, this language is substantially retained:
"The term 'subcontract' means any purchase order or agreement to perform all or any part of the work, or to make or furnish
any article, required for the performance of another contract or
subcontract. The term 'article' includes any material, part, assembly, machinery, equipment, or other personal property." 189

If renegotiation applies to patent royalties, it must be because of the
definition of "subcontract." No other section of the Renegotiation Act
can reasonably be construed to include them. Therefore, if royalties
are renegotiable they must first be personal property, second be "required for the performance" of another contract and third, must be
received in such an amount as to take the recipient outside of the statutory exemption which is m~asured by the volume of renegotiable business during the fiscal year. As to the first issue, little doubt can be
entertained but that inventions or patents upon which royalties are
being paid are personal property.100
189

The term "subcontract" was further amended by Pub. L. 149, 78th Cong.,
1st sess., approved July 14, 1943, 57 Stat. L. 564, to read as follows:
"The term 'subcontract' me.ins (i) any purchase order or agreement to perform
all or any part of the work, or to make or furnish any article, required for the performance of any other contract or subcontract or (ii) any contract or arrangement
(other than a contract or arrangement between two contracting parties, one of which
parties is found by the Secretary to be a bona fide executive officer, partner, or full-time
employee of the other contracting party), (A) any amount payable under which is contingent upon the procurement of a contract or contracts with a Department or of a subcontract or subcontracts thereunder, or determined with reference to the amount of such
a contact or subcontract or such contracts or subcontracts, or (B) under which any part
of the services performed or to be performed consists of the soliciting, attempting to
procure, or procuring a contract or contracts with a Department or a subcontract or
subcontracts thereunder: Provided, That nothing in this sentence shall be construed
(I) to affect in any way the validity or construction of provisions in any contract with
a Department or any subcontract thereunder, heretofore at any time or hereafter made,
prohibiting the payment of contingent fees -or commissions; or (2) to- restrict in any
way the authority of the Secretary to determine the nature or amount of selling expenses
under subcontracts as defined in (ii) herein, as a proper element of the contract price
or as a reimbursable item of cost, under a contract with a Department or a subcontract
thereunder."
This definition of subcontract is applicable to fiscal years ending before July 1,
1943. The Revenue Act of 1943 altered the term "subcontract" by excluding from
its operation contracts for the furnishing of office supplies and made certain other
technical changes so as to conform this definition with the featur<:s of the 1943 Act
relative to the creation of the War Contracts Price Adjustment Board. The essential
features of the term "subcontract," however, have not been redefined and remain the
same as are stated in the text of this article.
lUO Consolidated Fruit-Jar Co. v. Wright, 94 U.S. 92 at 96 (1876); Marsh v.
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Whether an invention is an "article," that is, personal property
which is "required for the performance of any other contract or subcontract" is a topic of somewhat greater difficulty. The problem, however, seems to yield to the analysis that if a certain invention is used in
the performance of a contract, it is required to do the work under the
contract and, of course, an agreement with the owner of the patented
or unpatented invention for the payment of royalties is necessary to
permit its use. This would seem true even though the company using
or manufacturing the thing to which the invention applies had a choice
of several of such inventions, any one of which would permit the
work at its completion to be furnished directly or indirectly to one of
the renegotiating age~cies. In the sense that one such invention is
necessary to perform the work, the invention which is used may be
said "to be required" for the performance of the other contract.
The legislative history of the Renegotiation Act gives a pretty clear
indication that Congress considered and intended renegotiation to
apply to royalties. When the first amendments to renegotiation were
being considered in September, 1942, which resulted in changing the
definition of "subcontract" as already mentioned, the War Department
asked that it be given the power to exempt patent license agreements
from renegotiation by administrative action.191
It does not appear whether the War Department.considered that
the law as it then stood gave the authority to renegotiate patent royalties or whether the contemplated amendments which redefine "subcontract" would give such authority. Regardless of this consideration Congress clear-ly beJieved that the 1942 Renegotiation Act permits the
renegotiation of royalties and intended that the 1943 Act also obtain
with regard to them.
·
Nichols, 128 U.S. 605 at 612 (1888); Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper
Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405 at 424, 28 S. Ct. 748 (1908); United States v. Dublier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178 at 187, 53 S. Ct. 554 (1933).
Wholly apart from the grant of a patent, the inventor has rights relative to the
manufacture, use and sale of his invention and has the further right to deprive the
public of its benefits by maintaining it in secrecy. Chemical Foundation, Inc. v.
General Aniline Works, Inc., (C.C.A. 3d, 1938) 99 Fed. (2d) 276, cet. den. 305
U.S. 654, 59 S. Ct. 249 (1938). An unpatented invention, therefore, seems also to
possess the qualities of personal property.
191 Statement of Mr. William L. Marbury in S. Hearings on § 403 of Pub. L.
No. 528, 77th Cong., 2d sess., September 22, 1942, (Committee on Finance) at p. 39:
" ••• In the opinion of the War Department, the Secretary should have authority
to exempt contracts of these types from renegotiation whenever he thinks it justified.
"Certain types of patent license agreements, certain types of leases, contracts to
be performed in Mexico, in Africa. • • ."
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The Revenue Bill of 1943, H.R. 3687 as it was introduced in the
House by Representative Doughton on November 18, 1943 defined
the term "excessive profits" in this way (p. 15 5):
"The term 'excessive profits' means the portion of the profits
derived from contracts with the Departments and subcontracts
which is determined in accordance with this section to be excessive
for the work and articles furnished. (Italics supplied).
The term "subcontract" was defined in this way (p. 158) :
"The term 'subcontract' means (A) any purchase order or
agreement ( other than a contract with a Department) to make or
furnish, or to perform any part of the work required for the making or furnishing of, a contract item 01: a component article. For
the purposes of this subparagraph (i) a 'contract item' means any
article, work, service, building, structure, improvement or facility
contracted for by a Department; (ii) a 'component article' means
any article which is to be incorporated in or as a part of a contract
item."
The phrase "for the work and articles furnished" found in the definition of excessive profits in this bill when coupled with the suggested
definition of subcontract, cast some doubt upon whether the proposed
bill would obtain with respect to the renegotiation of royal_ties. Therefore, the senate and house conferees agreed to eliminate these phrases
and left the definition of subcontract with the same meaning, as far as
patent royalties are concerned, that it had prior to the passage of the
Revenue Act of 1943.192
If license agreements calling for the payment of royalties are renegotiable when made under other renegotiable contracts, what amount
aside from other income must the licensor receive during a fiscal year to
192
H. Rep. No. 1079 on H.R. 3687, 78th Cong., 1st sess., 1943 (Conference
Committee) at p. 76:
"Amendment No. 218: ,This amendment eliminates a phrase [for the work and
articles furnished] which would cast doubt on the includibility in the term 'excessive
profits,' as used in the Renegotiation Act, of any portion of the profits derived from
patent license agreements. The House recedes."
Statement of Mr. Joseph M. Dodge in S. Hearings on H.R. 3687, 78th Cong.,
1st sess., December 6, 1943 (Committee on Finance) at p. 1080:
"Under the present law, it is clear that patent royalty contracts and other agreements involving intangible property rights are subject to renegotiation. The House
bill, in defining 'subcontract' and 'excessive profits' raises a substantial question as to
whether contracts of this type are renegotiable. This question should be resolved by
clarifying the definition of a contract 'article' by adding the words 'tangible or intangible' immediately following the phrase 'other personal property.'"
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be subject to renegotiation? With regard to the 1942 Act, royalties appear to be renegotiable by the terms of subsection (a) (5) (i), and by
the terms of the 1943 Act by subsection (a) (5) (A). In the case of the
renegotiation of a fiscal year ending before July 1, 1943, the act is not
applicable to any contractor whose aggregate sales arising from, contracts and subcontracts do not exceed $100,000 or, where brokers and
agents are concerned as described in subsection (a) (5) (ii) of that act,
where the subcontractor has not received $25,000 for the fiscal year
involved.193 It is very evident that if license agreements are subcontracts under renegotiation, they fall into this category by virtue of the
definition which defines subcontract as "aIJ.y purchase order or agreement to perform all or any part of the work, or to make or furnish any
article, required for the performance of any other contract or subcontract." License agreements do not become renegotiable by virtue of
that part of the Renegotiation Act which relates to amounts received
by brokers and agents, making them subject to the act when they have
received $2 5,ooo or more of renegotiable income. Thus licensors are
not subject to renegottation unless they have received $100,000 during
fiscal years ending before July 1, 1943 or $500,000 for fiscal years
ending after June 30, 1943.194 If less than these amounts are received,
except in those cases where a licensor may have received other income
which brings him within the purview of the act, royalties received by
the licensor are not renegotiable.
(To be Concluded in the October Issue of The Review.)
Subsection (c)(6)(iii) of the 1942 Act. Subsection (a)(5)(ii) of this act
relates to amounts received by brokers and agents not employees of the contractor•. In
the 1943 Act subsection (c)(6) raises the amount with respect to contracts and subcontracts from $100,000 to $500,000 but the amount with respect to sums received
by brokers and agents remains at $25,000.
194 Computed with regard to both the 1942 and 1943 Acts by including amounts
, received ·under contracts and subcontracts (exempted by other provisions of the act)
as provided in subsections (c)(6) of both the 1942 and 1943 Acts.
193

.,;

